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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper was prepared to serve as background for a workshop on mainstreaming fisheries co-
management, held in Cambodia in August 2005. The paper examines the policy and legislative 
frameworks for co-management in thirteen countries in Asia and the Pacific, and the extent to which 
these frameworks hinder or support co-management practices. 
Political will is the key to the establishment of co-management mechanisms. It is a necessary pre-
requisite without which co-management initiatives are unlikely to succeed. It must be reflected in 
policy, legislation and action specific to the fisheries sector, as well as more generally in government 
policy and legislative support. 
However, many current co-management initiatives remain pilot efforts only, and are strongly driven 
and supported by donor projects. The nature of policy and legislative frameworks is varied, as is 
commitment by governments to co-management – in some cases support is more rhetoric than reality, 
with insufficient real transfer of powers and financial resources to local levels.  
Through an analysis of the different case studies, ‘lessons learned’ are presented and a number of 
conclusions are drawn about the key characteristics of a supportive policy and legislative framework 
based on some ideas about ‘best practice’. The adoption of these characteristics by governments 
would demonstrate their commitment to co-management and increase the likelihood of co-
management success. 
 
Keywords: Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; fisheries co-management; 
community-based fisheries management; coastal fisheries; inland fisheries; Asia and the 
Pacific. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The document has been prepared by Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd1, with the 
support of FAO Development Law Service (LEGN)2 and the FAO FishCode Programme, to 
serve as background paper for the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission workshop on 
Mainstreaming Fisheries Co-management in Asia-Pacific, held in Cambodia, from 9 to 12 
August 2005. 
Co-management can be defined as a partnership approach where government and resource 
users share the responsibility and authority for the management of a fishery or area, based 
on collaboration between themselves and with other stakeholders.  
Co-management depends on four main pillars: i) supporting legislation and policies, 
ii) empowered communities, iii) good linkages between players and iv) finance and capacity. 
This paper focuses specifically on the first pillar and explores legislative and policy issues 
around co-management. In particular it attempts to draw out key lessons learned from 
experiences to date on an enabling policy and legislative environment for co-management. 
These lessons learned are generated from a case study review of different fisheries in Asia 
and the Pacific where co-management practices are known to exist. Case studies included in 
the review include: 
• Bangladesh (inland) 
• Cambodia (Tonle sap) 
• India (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) 
• Indonesia (Sasi Laut in Maluku) 
• Japan 
• Philippines Visayas 
• Sri Lanka (marine) 
• Southern Thailand 
• Vietnamese reservoirs 
• Pacific Island Countries (Fiji, Samoa, Cook Islands, and Vanuatu) 
Information on different cases was collected through a desk study approach, using a 
standard table template of questions as agreed between the consultants and FAO at the 
beginning of the study. Questions focussed on: 
• Background information on the case study area 
• The policy and legislative setting/basis for co-management 
• Implementation and enforcement of decisions made by co-management 
institutions 
• The motivation/drivers of co-management 
• General conclusions on the policy and legislative lessons learned, and issues of 
replicability 
                                                
1 Poseidon is a UK-registered company working globally to provide advice on fisheries and aquaculture issues.  
2 Blaise Kuemlangan and Anniken Skonhoft, FAO Legal Officers. 
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Sources of information included government officials, the FAOLEX3 database, specific pieces 
of national/local legislation, published sources of information on the internet4, and 
consultants/academics with knowledge of the case study fisheries concerned5. It should be 
noted that the purpose of the paper is not to provide a complete literature review on policy 
and legislation relating to co-management, but rather to access literature where it relates to 
the case studies. However, a range of more general literature on policy and legislative issues 
of co-management has also been reviewed, with references provided in Appendix 1. 
At the outset it was acknowledged that certain problems would probably arise in terms of 
being able to answer all questions on all case study fisheries selected. For example, 
published information on the case study fisheries was not expected to be available in the 
form of the template developed, and some interpretation has therefore been necessary. In 
addition, for some case studies responses to the questions in the template are either not 
easily available, or have been provided from a limited number of sources and may therefore 
be a little subjective in nature.  Nevertheless, while acknowledging these shortcomings, it 
was agreed to generate as much information as possible. 
The contents of this report are structured so that following this Introduction, Section 2 
presents a short summary of each of the case studies themselves. Section 3 then provides 
some conclusions and ideas about “best practice” – first in relation to policy, and then 
legislation.  
In Appendix 2, a table is provided against which all countries in the Asia/Pacific region could 
benchmark the performance of their own policy and legislative framework in terms of its 
support for co-management. 
2. PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES 
This section of the report provides a summary description of the policy and legislative issues 
relating to co-management in the case study fisheries concerned. 
2.1 Bangladesh (inland) 
Background information 
This case study primarily examines the results of the community-based fisheries 
management (CBFM) project, which has been working in 19 rivers, open floodplain wetlands 
(beels) and closed permanent lakes (beels and baors), principally in the north east of the 
country, since 1995. Fishers in the area are predominantly part-time and seasonal in nature, 
but with some full-time/permanent fishing. 
The Oxbow Lake Co-management Project (1988–1997), and a USAID aquatic ecosystems 
project supporting community-based resource management organizations, have also been 
active in supporting co-management. 
Policy and legislative setting 
While sustainable management of aquatic resources forms an important part of the 1998 
National Fisheries Policy, co-management is not provided for in policy. Important pieces of 
                                                
3 A database of legislation from many countries that is maintained by FAO legal office in Rome. While FAOLEX is a reliable 
source of information for laws and regulations, it may not be up-to-date for all countries (http://faolex.fao.org/faolex).  
4 A list of useful websites and a bibliography by case study, is provided in Appendix 1. 
5 Individuals who contributed information or comment are acknowledged in Appendix 1, as a source of information (Pers. 
Comm.), and the authors would like to thank all those who assisted with this study. 
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fisheries legislation include: The Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950 (amended 
1982); The Tanks Improvement Act, 1939 (amended 1986); The Fish and Fish Products 
Ordinance, 1983; and The Marine Fisheries Ordinance, 1983. None of this legislation 
specifically deals with co-management issues. Legislation does not provide for community 
use rights, but the leasing system can be used for the benefit of “genuine fishers” (those 
whose livelihood depended on catching and selling the fish). Under the project agreement, 
groups of fishers have established exclusive rights in beels. But free access and a lack of 
revenue collection mean that in rivers there is now no formal basis for establishing territorial-
use rights. 
Decentralization is not explicitly addressed in fisheries policy documents and at present, the 
government system in Bangladesh is primarily “de-concentrated” rather than “devolved”. The 
Constitution provides for the creation of local government bodies at every administrative 
level, and the evolution of decentralization measures towards local governance in 
Bangladesh have been taking place at a non-sectoral level over many decades. However 
decentralization policies in Bangladesh have served primarily to create a sub-national 
political support base for successive regimes. Decentralization initiatives have suffered from 
a lack of genuine political commitment, and in neither non-sectoral legislation or policy on 
decentralization, is co-management recognized. 
Implementation and enforcement 
Beels and rivers are managed through Management Committees. In areas covered by the 
CBFM project, the following local regulations and policy have been adopted. 
• Closed beels and baors: fingerling purchases, closed season, guarding, 
rotational harvesting, sharing of income, and taking of loans to meet collective 
costs. 
• Open beels: sanctuary delineation and protection, habitat re-excavation, closed 
season, gear restrictions 
• Rivers: sanctuaries, fish culture in pens, limited fishing grounds, rotation fishing, 
commitment not to use “harmful” gear. 
 
Conflicts between user groups, and the capacity of local organizations, have been the main 
problems in developing and enforcing such local arrangements. 
Under the project arrangements, revenue is collected by the fisher communities, with NGOs 
facilitating local administrative support to define and protect the fishers' use rights, and 
providing technical advice for sustainable and sound fishery management. At a more general 
non-project and non-sectoral level, Union Parishad (UPs) have the power to raise revenue 
from various local sources, although these are limited and generally collection rates are low. 
Drivers of co-management 
The Project has been driven by Worldfish Centre/ICLARM, Bangladesh Department of 
Fisheries (DOF) and five NGOs (Caritas, Proshika, BRAC, Banchte Shekha and CRED), 
principally to deal with resource over exploitation and inequity arising from the leasing 
system. 
General conclusions 
Community-based fisheries management, and/or co-management arrangements are not part 
of the formal current management tools adopted by Government, and there is not an 
especially supportive legal or policy framework for co-management in fisheries. Activities are 
currently thus strongly driven/supported by donors and NGOs. 
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In the CBFM project areas, there are some good examples of cooperation from local leaders 
that have helped to resolve problems. Significant changes in indicators of empowerment 
(participation and influence) and institutional efficiency (ease of decision-making) are 
reported in the beels (both closed and open), but the pattern of change has been less clear 
in the rivers. 
There have been particularly high levels of conflict in rivers that Management Committees 
have not always been able to reduce. There are many examples of competition heightened 
by the lifting of leases and consequent open access. This has resulted in encroachment by 
landowners in open river areas, and locally influential people have also attempted to take 
control of rivers by having them declared closed waters (and thus leaseable). 
2.2 Cambodia (Tonle sap) 
Background information 
This case study covers the Tonle Sap Lake Basin, and a process of community/co-
management that began in 2000. The Tonle Sap Lake covers an area of a quarter of a 
million hectares in the dry season, and during the wet season, floods into an area of 1.0 to 
1.6 million hectares. The lakes resources support around 1.2 million people. Elsewhere in the 
country local coastal projects have been initiated by NGOs to organize fisheries communities 
for the management of coastal resources. In inland fisheries, experiments of co-management 
have also been started in local communities in the Mekong River Basin since 1994 under the 
framework of the Mekong River Commission Fisheries Programme. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Fisheries management of Tonle Sap has traditionally revolved around the separation 
between large-scale commercial exploitation of so-called fishing lots, and middle-scale and 
family fisheries based upon definitions of seasonality, spatial arrangements and the type of 
fishing gear used. In October 2000, Prime Minister Hun Sen initiated a reform of the fisheries 
sector, partly in response to an escalating level of conflict. The Prime Minister decided to 
release 56 percent of the fishing lots (from large-scale commercial exploitation), so that 
control of these areas reverted to local communities. The Prime Minister directed the 
government to devise a new fisheries management plan providing for the empowerment of 
local communities for managing fisheries resources at the local level. The draft five-year 
General Fisheries Plan (GFP) for Tonle Sap recognizes community management, and co-
management as a strategy to achieve the Plan’s objectives although has not yet been 
formally adopted by the Government of Cambodia. 
The Fisheries and Administration Law (Fiat-Law No. 33 Kro chor of 1987), which is the 
principal fisheries legislation, does not provide for co-management arrangements or 
mechanisms. However, in early June 2005, the Government of Cambodia adopted the Sub-
Decree on Community Fisheries Management. It is designed to promote co-management of 
fisheries resources. It provides the rules and procedures for establishing and managing 
community fisheries throughout the Kingdom of Cambodia. Each community fishery is to be 
led by a Community Fisheries Committee (CFC). No community fishery is allowed to manage 
fisheries in a designated area unless it has entered into an agreement, referred to as a 
community fisheries area agreement, with the Government of Cambodia through the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF). This agreement defines the extent of the designated area (a 
plan must be attached), provides the list of community fisheries and CFC members, local 
fisheries regulations and a statement setting forth management objectives. Community 
fisheries areas remain state public property, but community use rights are granted for a 
renewable three-year period. 
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The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)’s five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP), 1996-2000, provided an initial policy experiment in local governance and the 
formulation and implementation of coherent local development programs and activities. It 
established a general framework for a decentralized and participatory approach to rural 
development through a new rural development and management structure consisting of 
successive levels. In addition, in March 2001, the King promulgated the Law on 
Administration of Communes (Khum/Sangkat) and the Commune Election Law, which 
provided the legal framework for the establishment of elected councils in Cambodia’s 1 621 
communes and sangkat in February 2002. The goal of commune administration is the 
promotion of good governance through the sustainable utilization of local resources to satisfy 
people’s basic needs for present and future generations (article 41 of the Law on 
Administration of Communes). 
Implementation and enforcement 
Co-management is still in its infancy in Cambodia. Key difficulties in developing local 
rules/policy appear to be establishing a consensus amongst community members, and 
interference of local authorities and administrations (in order to maintain the status quo). It is 
the duty of the DOF, through its newly formed Community Fisheries Development Office, to 
assist community fisheries in drafting management plans and community fisheries area 
agreements. DOF should also be instrumental in helping community fisheries find financial 
resources. The Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries Management provides that community 
fisheries may derive monies from: contributions from community fisheries members (fees); 
donations from charity groups; grants from the Government of Cambodia; international 
organizations and NGOs; and any other legal sources of financing.  
Community fisheries are required to report and provide information on any fisheries violation 
that takes place in the community fisheries area to the nearest competent fisheries officer. As 
a result, fisheries communities are not authorized to arrest alleged infringers or confiscate 
any illegal fishing gear used in the community fisheries area. 
Drivers of co-management 
Government and the international donor community and NGOs have been important drivers. 
The main motivations have been problems relating to resource sustainability, equity of 
access to fishing grounds, and conflict reduction between small-scale fishers and lot owners 
(large-scale fishing operations). 
General conclusions 
The introduction of co-management and a new policy and legislative environment marks a 
departure from the century long management system based on fishing lots, and 
decommissioning of fishing lots has permitted greater access to fishing grounds and reduced 
social tension. In addition, the legislative framework now formally recognizes the existence of 
community fisheries and empowers them through the CFC to manage fisheries activities 
within their area of jurisdiction. And there are laws relating to Communes, which could be 
beneficial as a framework for co-management. But in practical terms, there is no clear-cut 
procedure for the establishment of community fisheries, and the legislative framework does 
not address the issue of equitable representation of local community’s interests in the 
community fisheries. In addition the Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries Management 
nicely sets out community fisheries sources of financing, but fails to make any provisions 
specifying where such monies should be deposited, the purposes for which they can be 
used, and the decision-making process to decide how acquired funds should be spent. 
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2.3 India (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) 
Background information 
This case study considers the stake net fisheries in Vallarpadam Island, Cochin estuary, 
Kerala, and the mixed mechanized and traditional vessel fishery in Veerapandianpattinam, in 
Tamil Nadu. Both are community-management fisheries. 
In many other areas, local level organizations and fisher representative institutions are well 
formed and are active in terms of both advocacy and engagement with government at 
different levels, and management of their own affairs. There are informal community 
management schemes in place in many parts of India. 
Policy and legislative setting 
The federal nature of the political setting in India is important for fisheries management. 
Marine fisheries within the territorial waters (up to 12nm) are the subject of maritime states 
whereas fisheries beyond this limit within the EEZ fall in the jurisdiction of Central 
Government. Co-management and/or community management are not referred to in the 
national Comprehensive Marine Fishing Policy of 2004, except in so far as “Fish aggregating 
devices would be promoted as a community based activity”, and “Ornamental fish breeding 
and coastal cage aquaculture would be developed with a community orientation”. State 
policies have not been reviewed for all States for this paper, but informal web-based the 
Tamil Nadu fisheries policy makes no mention of either co-management or community 
management. It is thought that Kerala is the only State in India which has a formal fisheries 
policy, although all States have their yearly and 5-yearly planning processes. 
The subject of fisheries is in the state list under article 21 of the Indian Constitution, so 
management and control of coastal fisheries is vested with the maritime states and union 
territories. At the same time the Union Government carries out management and control of 
the fishing activities beyond territorial limits in the EEZ (through the Maritime Zone of India 
(MZI) Act, 1981), but this legislation essentially relates just to foreign fishing vessel activity. 
Other Executive Orders relate to national vessels operating outside the 12nm zone. Specific 
legislation relating to co-management is not thought to be contained in national legislation, or 
in the Tamil Nadu Marine Fisheries Act, 1983, the Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Act in 
1980, or in the Travancore-Cochin Fisheries Act of 1950 used to regulate Cochin estuarine 
fisheries. The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 1991 specifically provides for fishers’ 
rights to access to coastal land, and is the only group to supported in this manner. 
Community use rights are afforded to certain castes of fishers, and non-fisheries specific 
legislation can also make provision community use rights. However, principal fisheries 
legislation is not thought to provide for community use rights. 
Implementation and enforcement 
In Vallarpadam Island, three padu grounds operating with unlicensed fishers use a system of 
rotational access. Each of the three grounds has its own cooperative, called a sangham. 
There are three main areas that the sangham tries to support: equitable access, providing 
collective social responsibility, and mechanisms for conflict resolutions. Sanghams are 
registered with the state’s registrar’s office. Along with ensuring equitable access, the padu 
system also prohibits fishing during incoming tides when shrimp are migrating from the sea 
to the backwaters. There is no mechanism for the three groups of unlicenced fishers to 
coordinate with one another, and while each sangham is limited in its own membership, there 
is no overall control of fisher numbers as a whole, or on those who may want to fish the 
waters. The three sanghams do not interact with licensed fishers, or with various levels of the 
government. 
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In Veerapandianpattinam, there are rules for spatial distribution of the mechanized and 
traditional boats, seasonal restrictions (e.g. in November for mechanized boats) and certain 
activities e.g. pair trawling, that are not allowed under any circumstances. The boat owners’ 
association and the fishers’ association self-enforce these rules, supported by additional 
government surveillance. 
Drivers of co-management 
In both case study fisheries, the community themselves were original drivers of management 
arrangements. In Vallarpadam Island the main motivations were equitable access, providing 
collective social responsibility, and mechanisms for conflict resolution. In 
Veerapandianpattinam motivations included: damage caused by mechanized boats to fishing 
gear of traditional fishers and associated financial loss; the danger posed by mechanized 
boats to traditional fishers in the form of collisions and resulting injury; and degradation and 
damage to marine resources. 
General conclusions 
While the Constitution and national fisheries policy devolves legislative powers to States for 
fisheries management, national policy does not refer to co-management, and most State 
fisheries policies (where they exist) are also thought to be silent on the issue. Legislation is 
also not specifically supportive of provisions for co-management. Community management is 
thus far more common than full co-management in India, partly because of the large 
numbers of fisher organizations in the country. 
Recognising the limitations of basing generalization on the two examples of community 
management considered above, it appears that compared to many other countries, there 
could be greater recognition of the role of established community management groups, and 
provision for the legal codification of traditional community management rules. 
2.4 Indonesia (Sasi Laut in Maluku) 
Background information 
This case study examines the sasi laut system of community management in Maluku. People 
believe sasi to be at least 400 yrs old, but the historical documentation is all post-colonial. 
The Maluku fishery can be divided into two basic groups: artisanal and commercial. A 
harvester who fishes from the shore or from a small perahu without a motor and uses a hand 
line, spear, trap or simple net, is considered artisanal. Operators of large pole and line 
vessels, seiners using deep-water fish aggregating devices (FADs) and floating lift nets, 
together with their crew, are in the commercial sector. In the middle are the gill netters and 
seiners using small, motorized craft. The majority of central Maluku fishers falls into the 
artisanal category and are, in fact, fisher-farmers. 
Many traditional community based systems of resource management exist in Indonesia, such 
as Sasi, Panglima Laut, Lubuk Larangan, Lebak Lubung, Maawu Danau, Ikan Larangan, 
Ikan Diniatkan, Suaka Perikanan and others. Co-management is also now practised in some 
areas. For example, deployment of the artificial reefs in the Jemluk waters off the island of 
Bali, Indonesia, paved the way for the local fishers to establish a fishery co-management 
system. And Districts are now declaring their own Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), and 
already have community-based management areas, and traditional/indigenous MPAs. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Within the fisheries sector, government has historically been preoccupied with intensification 
of the fishery. Government policy has focussed strongly on the fisheries sector contributing to 
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national economic growth through an increase in fish production and sustainable fishery 
resources, and co-management is not an integral part of fisheries policy. 
The concept of co-management is also not expressly mentioned in the Fisheries Act No. 31 
of 2004, although reference is made to community participation. The Act promotes 
community participation in fisheries management and provides for the taking into account of 
adat law (customary law and tradition). It establishes new institutions such as the Council for 
the Assessment of National Fisheries Development, led by the President, which consists of 
representatives of the private sector in addition to relevant Ministers. Furthermore, it provides 
for the empowerment of small-scale fishers and fish farmers through access to credit, 
education and training, and development of small-scale fishers and fish farmers groups and 
fisheries cooperatives. It also makes provision for the delegation of “fisheries functions” from 
the central Government to regional Governments, and for community participation in law 
enforcement through reporting of violations of fisheries laws and regulations by local 
communities. The exact nature and extent of fisheries functions to be delegated to the 
regional level of government, and the nature of community participation in law enforcement, 
remain to be determined through regulation. 
Legislation does not provide for community use rights, but village tenure over a defined area 
of both land and sea is strongly entrenched in the culture and recognized as legitimate by 
fishers even though it is not formally supported by law. Based on adat in Maluku province, 
coastal villages claim de facto rights over marine territory. 
Regional legislation can be supportive of co-management, for example, the Provincial 
Decreee of Nangroe Aceh Darrussalam No. 21/2002 on natural resources management, 
specifies in Article 15 that the management of natural resources in an area has to be 
implemented with recognition and protection of local customary community or local 
community rights, as well as recognition of customary laws. 
There is a strong national government policy (non-sectoral) of decentralization. The 1999 
Autonomy Act and its revision in the Law 32/2004 on “regional governance” devolve powers 
and responsibilities to provincial and district levels. The Law 32/2004 specifically covers 
natural resource utilization. Legislation establishes a control mechanism designed to ensure 
the conformity of regional regulations with higher-ranking legal norms whereby the central 
government is empowered to revoke regional regulations that are found to be conflicting with 
government regulations or laws. More than 10 percent of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries now goes straight to the district level, the deconcentrated budget for marine and 
fisheries development and management has significantly increased in recent years. Eighty 
per cent of licence/fee revenue at province and district level can also be retained. 
Implementation and enforcement 
Sasi is a set of rules and regulations that govern resource use, but it also applies to social 
behaviour. With regard to marine resources, there are regulations on the use of poisonous 
plants and other chemicals, destructive nets and intensive gear. There are also regulations 
concerning access to the sasi area, activities allowed in the sasi area, and seasonal rules of 
entry and harvest. All these rules are guarded and enforced by an institution known as the 
kewang, which functions as a local police force. Their legitimacy, as well as that of the sasi 
institution itself, is based on “adat”. Other enforcers who may be involved in marine sasi are 
the police. Their role has increased since the 1979 law on village government left the kewang 
outside of the formal government structure.  
In many cases, the character and legitimacy of the village head (kepala desa) is the key to 
successful marine sasi, and where deficient, problems can then occur. Other problems 
include: capacity for enforcement against poachers from outside the community; changing 
cultural/ethical/spiritual values with modernization and globalization; religious conflict; and 
competition and degradation of marine habitats and stocks. 
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Drivers of co-management 
Traditionally, the local communities themselves were the main drivers of this form of 
community management. However, more recently NGO and academic researchers, noting 
trends in resource degradation and the decline of sasi, have begun to encourage the 
government to look for ways to revive or establish local management, with sasi as the basis. 
At the village level, the incentive for considering local management is most often the potential 
for the village government to collect resource rents, which is already an established feature 
of sasi as currently practiced in Maluku. For fishers themselves, the incentives are more 
linked to culture than to a consciousness of the need for management. 
General conclusions 
While fisheries sector policy is not supportive of co-management, the Fisheries Act No. 31 of 
2004 and the 1999 Autonomy Act and its revision through the Law 32/2004, together provide 
an opportunity for local government to develop their own fishery resource management 
mechanisms, potentially in consultation with communities. Yet this task is not easy to 
perform, as provincial governments, represented by fishery services, have insufficient 
capacities to do so. For more than 30 years, fishery services were just a subordination of the 
central government, with their main task being to implement centrally-planned programmes 
and projects. 
Under sasi, basic management concepts are internalized and legitimized, and the sasi 
institution has proved to have demonstrable social and environmental benefits, although the 
ability for enforcement is sometimes limited. However, the sasi institution is in decline and in 
many villages has disappeared, while the need for local management is in many areas more 
urgent than ever. Sasi provides an efficient and legitimate base through adat on which to 
build co-management structures. But such community-based and traditional management 
mechanisms, are increasingly under threat. Formal and legal recognition and support of local 
community rights, practices and responsibilities could help to ensure a solid base for building 
more competent local resource management institutions. 
2.5 Japan 
Background information 
This case study considers the sakuraebi (small pink shrimp, Sergia lucens) fishery in Suruga 
Bay, Shizuoka Prefecture (west of Tokyo). There are 120 vessels operating mid-water pair 
trawls. Fishers from two neighbouring Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs) are involved; 
in 1968 they formed a single Fishery Management Organization (FMO). As with the other 
country studies, many comments on policy and legislative aspects of co-management linked 
to the specific cases examined relate to other national coastal fisheries in Japan. According 
to the latest Fishery Census (2003), there were 1 608 co-management regimes nationwide. 
Japanese coastal capture fisheries are virtually all managed on co-management principles. It 
should be noted that given the large number of co-management arrangements across Japan, 
there are many differences in the implementation of co-management practices, as well 
similarities. What can be generalized, is the fact that Japan demonstrates many of the ideal 
characteristics of a supportive policy and legislative framework for co-management. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Fishery co-management arrangements formally became part of national fisheries policy in 
1983.  Fisheries law was recently modified in the Basic Law of Fisheries enacted in 2001, but 
for many decades has recognized co/community-management. “Meiji Fishery Law” was first 
established in 1901, and then revised in 1949 (Shouwa law). The Japanese fishery 
management regime utilizes fishery cooperatives, called Fishery Cooperative Associations, 
which are juridical persons and are granted territorial user rights (called common fishing 
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rights) established by law for capture fisheries within coastal waters of its jurisdiction. In 1948 
the Fisheries Cooperative Association Law (Law No. 242, 1948) established the legal 
foundation of FCAs. By law, fishing rights are granted mainly to FCAs, and the FCA 
members are entitled to fish within that territory.  
The Marine Fisheries Resource Development Promotion Law of 1971 was amended in 1990, 
establishing the Resource Management Agreement System, and is also of relevance. This 
system encourages autonomous agreements among fishers for the purpose of conducting 
resource management under more intensive and yet stricter rules than had previously been 
the case under prefectural fishery coordinating regulations, FCA regulations and FMO rules. 
When an agreement prevails at a certain level within the area, the government can affirm the 
agreement, and it becomes an official rule. It constitutes an official support system for 
autonomous resource management by fishers. 
Decentralization is legislated for to devolve decision-making power to local areas and 
authorities/governments in the Constitution, and in the Local Autonomy Law 1947, which is 
the core legislation for dealing with local government organization and management 
supported by other laws.  The Local Autonomy Law was amended by the Law Concerning 
the Provision of Related Laws for the Promotion of Decentralization of Power (Omnibus 
Decentralization Act). 
Decentralization is also provided for under the Basic Fisheries Law, with co-ordinating 
organizations from the national to the local level being: Fishery Policy Council; Wide Area 
Fisheries Co-ordinating Committees; Area Fisheries Co-ordinating Committees; Local 
Fisheries Co-operative Associations; and more specialized FMOs. Coordination of fisheries’ 
issues, such as rights/license distribution and local regulations, is achieved through these 
multilevel coordinating organizations. Government and/or research institutes provide support 
with planning, scientific advice. Both fisheries policy and legislation specifically recognize co-
management within the scope of decentralization. 
Implementation and enforcement 
Implementation of co-management arrangements is mostly initiated by FCAs/FMOs, but 
assistance is available from government institutions, such as regional offices of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, fisheries divisions of prefectural government, and 
Fisheries Experimental Stations. FCAs administer the use of fishing rights; that is, rules 
regarding who, how, where and when to fish are decided internally. In the sakuraebi fishery, 
its biological nature – it can be fished only during the night near the shore – makes poaching 
difficult.  Penalty codes exist, but most enforcement among members is through peer-
pressure. Management is considered a success overall; it is profitable and has endured for 
more than three decades.  Resource management/conservation aspects are, however, not 
rigorously applied partly due to the lack of scientific information on stock level and its 
fluctuations. In other co-managed fisheries in Japan, social regulation is also said to be very 
important, and violation of rules is considered severe. Social sanctions are considered a 
serious punishment. 
Drivers of co-management 
Throughout Japan, government serves to codify and support co-management regimes rather 
than impose them. Declining catches in the face of ever-advancing technology, have led 
many fishers and fisher organizations to realize the need to manage and conserve 
resources. 
General conclusions 
In Japan, the fisheries policy and legislative framework is extremely supportive of co-
management. Other non-fisheries specific pieces if legislation are also very important in 
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supporting such arrangements. Territorial use rights granted through legislation to FCAs and 
membership-control by FCAs, both supported by Fisheries Law, provide for well-defined 
geographical and membership boundaries. And since FCAs themselves are institutions for 
collective action with a long historical background, it is not surprising that they have 
established their own mechanisms of consensus building and handling disputes among 
fishers. Also, since many members of FCAs live in the same community, there is a sufficient 
accumulation of social capital among its members to facilitate co-management regimes. 
However, almost 40 percent of FCAs in Japan are in now in financial deficit. The National 
Assembly of FCA Representatives has adopted a cooperative movement policy (CMP) for 
revamping business organization and management, and plans to amalgamate FCAs where 
necessary. 
2.6 Philippines Visayas 
Background information 
This case study is based on a variety of ongoing or planned co-management initiatives in the 
Visayas, including: Northeastern Iloilo Province (7 contiguous coastal municipalities); 
Pagapas Bay; the marine sanctuary in San Salvador Island; Bolinao; Danao Bay; Malalison 
Island; Caliling; and Cogtong Bay. Many other provinces in the country with a coastal, 
baywide or gulf domain have community management arrangements in place. In general co-
management generally commenced from the 1980’s onwards, as supported initially by local 
NGOs and later by development projects. One of the earliest initiatives of community 
management in coastal areas was the Central Visayas Regional Project (CVRP) 
implemented by the government and supported by the World Bank. The CVRP fostered new 
institutional arrangements for planning and implementing community-based rural 
development by applying participatory approaches at the barangay level. This was followed 
by other projects focused on community resource management. Among them were the 
Coastal Resource Management Programme and the Fisheries Sector Program (renamed 
Fisheries Resources Management Program in its second phase). 
Policy and legislative setting 
The policy environment in the Philippines now provides for the participation of community 
groups and other non-state actors in what have traditionally been considered state affairs. In 
addition, the 1987 Philippine Constitution contains important provisions that invoke general 
protection of the environment, although responsibility rests primarily with the State. 
Legislated policy in the form of the preamble of the Philippines Fisheries Code of 1998 (Sec. 
2. Declaration of Policy) confirms and enhances the co-management policy of the 
Government.  
The Philippine Fisheries Code is a complete departure from the previous policy/legislative 
direction of maximizing fishery utilization and pushing for fisheries as a preferred area for 
investment without the necessary social and environmental safety nets. The new law 
provides for the preferential rights of small-scale fishers and, requires that their participation 
in aquatic councils be established in all coastal areas in the country.  
In 1991, the Local Government Code became the country’s centrepiece legislation on 
devolution. Through its implementation, the transfer of political power and responsibility from 
national to local government units was pursued. In addition, the law requires local 
governments to have people’s and NGOs as active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. 
The Fisheries Code of 1998 supports the Local Government Code and enables the 
establishment of co-management units in the form of registered fisherfolk organizations and 
cooperatives. The Code provides for the establishment of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
Management Councils (FARMC) at national and municipal levels to carry out management 
advisory functions in collaboration with Local Government Units (LGUs). 
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Implementation and enforcement 
Municipal Ordinances and Resolutions have been used to support locally agreed 
management rules. However, getting the support of the majority of the municipal councilors 
to approve the passage of an ordinance has not always been easy, and local fisheries 
organizations and initiatives have sometimes been co-opted by vested interests in 
government and business. And, some examples of inconsistent policy have been noted. For 
example, in Cogtown Bay in late 1980’s locals were being encouraged to preserve mangrove 
areas, but the Government issued fish pond lease permits even though the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources had not issued mangrove-cutting permits for outsiders 
in mangrove areas.  
Financial and technical decentralization is in place even at the town level. The Local 
Government Code of 1991 delegates to the local government units and people’s 
organizations the task of managing their own resources: “Municipalities have the exclusive 
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters (15 km from the coastline) and 
impose rentals, fees, or charges.” But the technical and financial capability of municipalities 
and their field staff is often lacking to address or meet the demands of good management 
and conservation. 
Drivers of co-management 
Local NGOs and international donors have been the principal drivers of most co-
management initiatives to date, despite the favourable steps taken by the government in 
amending policy and legislation in support of such arrangements.  
Principal motivations have been an awareness of conflicts between subsistence and 
commercial fishers and resource depletion, in the context of a more “participatory” paradigm 
following the decline of the Marcos regime. 
General conclusions 
In summary, the government has established a favourable policy and legislative environment 
for co-management. However, while Municipal Ordinances have been used to support 
management measures, the ability of government and local level institutions to implement 
policy and fully engage with co-management initiatives is still lacking. As a result, the 
majority of initiatives have been NGO and donor driven, and remain pilot schemes. 
Communities have not always been that engaged in, and supportive of, the process, 
especially when activities are not immediately self-financing. This raises questions about 
sustainability in the long term, even though some initiatives have successfully run 
environmental awareness campaigns, and provided enterprise development/loans at the 
same time as resource management measures, with activities reported to have led to 
increased catches and greater species diversity. 
Co-management has been shown to be strongly dependent on good relations with local 
political figures. Local leaders who withdraw support for a particular initiative can effectively 
wipe out any gains the initiative might otherwise have had under a more supportive political 
regime. Conflicts between small and commercial fishers continue, and illegal fishing remains 
common in many areas. 
2.7 Sri Lanka (marine) 
Background information 
This study reports on various community and co-management arrangements throughout 
coastal areas of the country. Community-management practices have been in place since 
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pre-1990 in: The Jakottu or fish kraal fishing in the Madu Ganga estuary in the Southern 
Province; the Kattudel (staked seine) net fishery in the Negombo Lagoon in the Western 
Province; the trawler and beach seine shrimp fishery in the North Western Province; the 
rotational beach seine fishery in the Western and Southern Provinces; the live bait fishery in 
Egodauyana, near Panadura; and Chilaw lagoon shrimp stake net fisheries. A more general 
example of co-management among different stakeholders is found in the Special Area 
Management (SAM) process, which is now being implemented in many parts of Sri Lanka. 
Two such management sites are the Hikkaduwa and the Rekawa coastal areas. Most 
co/community-management arrangements in marine, lagoon, estuarine and reservoir 
fisheries relate to small-scale multispecies fisheries with a mix of full-time and part-
time/seasonal fishing activity, using a range of trap/pot, line, set/passive nets and active nets, 
brush piles, cast nets, scoop nets. There are 15 022 small traditional craft (48 % motorized) 
used in lagoons and coastal areas. 
Policy and legislative setting 
While fisheries policy is not specific about co-management, one of the overarching policies of 
the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources is the requirement for transparency, 
consultation and involvement of stakeholders in management planning and implementation. 
And The Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act (Act No. 2 of 1996) provides for the 
designation by the Minister responsible for fisheries of “prescribed areas of Sri Lanka Waters 
or land adjacent thereto or both such waters and land as fisheries management areas for the 
purposes of this Act” (Section 31 (1) (a)). Registered fishers residing or engaged in fishing in 
a fisheries management area or part thereof, or migrant fishers may form themselves into a 
fisheries committee (Section 32 (1) of Act No. 2 of 1996). Legislation is used to demarcate 
areas for different users/gear or fisheries committees. 
In addition, an advisory body, known as the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Advisory 
Council and headed by the Secretary to the Ministry responsible for fisheries, is established 
at the central level to advise the Minister responsible for fisheries on all matters relating to 
the management, regulation, conservation and development of fisheries and aquatic 
resources in Sri Lanka waters. Representatives of the fishers are among the membership 
(Section 3 and 4 of Act No. 2 of 1996). 
The Coast Conservation Act, 1981 is also relevant and makes provision for the identification 
of special coastal areas needing management and the establishment of management 
committees with the participation of all stakeholders, including fishers. The SAM process 
deals with planning and conflict both within the fisheries sector, and between fisheries and 
other sectors. Areas are identified as areas needing Special Management Measures in the 
legislation. 
Sri Lanka witnessed the transition of governance from a centralized to a decentralized form 
in 1987, after the Government enacted the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The 
Thirteenth Amendment provided for the establishment of a Provincial Council in each 
province, the membership of which is determined under the Provincial Council Act taking into 
account the area and the population.  
Implementation and enforcement 
Local Fisheries Management Authorities under the new Act have the power to make 
recommendations to the Minister on: the conduct of fishing operations and the use of 
different types of fishing gear in a particular local fishing management; closed seasons for 
fishing or closed seasons for catching of specified species of fish in the area; the times 
during which fish may be taken. 
Disputes between user groups have been settled by government over a number of decades 
using a dispute resolution mechanism that has resulted in specific local regulations being 
made, and which can be thought of as a form of co-management. Fisheries Ordinance 1940 
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contains detailed provisions to deal with disputes. Sections 20 and 20A, provide regulations 
to appoint a Committee of Inquiry or a Commissioner to deal with fishing disputes. Many 
area-specific regulations have resulted from this process. The Chilaw Lagoon Fisheries 
Regulations of 1993 provide one such example.  Stake net fishing is practiced with the main 
species caught being prawns. The fishing rights are shared between three clans, who 
together formed the Traditional Kattudel Owners Association. The three main groups, each 
closely associated with a particular church, are allocated different fishing days. Sub-groups 
are organized for fishing purposes. Since only male descendants of Kattudel fishers can 
become owners, entry to the fishery is limited, and any disputes are dealt with by the 
Association. The areas set aside by custom for the Kattudel fishing industry have, as a result 
of conflict with fishers using other methods, been demarcated by the courts. A Government 
commission was set up to settle a number of disputes and fix equitable fishing times and 
areas for fishers living on the lagoon. 
Drivers of co-management 
Communities have been main drivers of community management, while all parties are 
generally supportive of the Special Area Management process. The main motivations for co-
management have been conflicts and resource depletion. But it should be noted that the 
devolution of power (and the establishment of Provincial Councils) in Sri Lanka was politically 
driven, largely as an alternative to the demand for a separate state by Tamil political parties 
and the militant separatist groups, rather than with resource management objectives in mind. 
General conclusions 
While fisheries policy is not specific about co-management, policy and legislation is generally 
supportive of co-management in Sri Lanka. General principles of transparency and 
participation are included in fisheries policy, and there is a Constitutional provision for 
decentralization. Fisheries legislation provides for the codification of many community 
management rules through local by-laws and regulations, the provision for management by 
fisheries committees, and a dispute resolution. Co-management is also fostered by important 
non-fisheries legislation relating to coastal conservation. Fishers’ cooperative societies can 
provide the necessary focus within a community on which a management system could be 
based. The number of cooperative societies, their membership and financial resources (both 
internally generated and loans) have greatly increased since 1989, and this provides a 
growing base for possible co/community-based management. This coupled with the new Act 
providing for Local Fisheries Management Authorities provides for a strong basis for co-
management. 
2.8 Southern Thailand 
Background information 
This case study examines management arrangements in two areas in southern Thailand: 
Phang-Nga Bay on the Andaman Sea coast since 1995; and Bang Saphan Bay, Prachuap 
Khiri Khan Province, in the Gulf of Thailand since 1999. Fisheries in Phang-Nga Bay have 
been traditionally conducted by small-scale fisherfolk employing artisanal fishing gear such 
as bamboo-stake traps, hook-and-line and fish traps, targeting multispecies fisheries. The 
majority of fishers in Bang Saphan Bay are characterized as small-scale multispecies fishers 
using the following gear: squid and anchovy cast nets; squid jigs; scoop nets; hook and line; 
anchovy purse seine; squid trap; fish and crab gill nets; some diving. 
Other initiatives are reported in Sikao Bay, Songkhla Lake, Amphur Thalang of Phuket, and 
Pattani Bay and Amphur Pana Reh of Pattani. Also of note is the CHARM Project’s National 
Co-management Initiative in Thailand; a five-year partnership (2002-2007) between the 
Government of Thailand and the EU. CHARM had adopted both a top-down and bottom-up 
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approach, with local and provincial level governments playing a key role in the 
decentralization and co-management approach. 
Policy and legislative setting 
The objectives for fisheries management evolve from the National Economic and Social 
Development Plans issued by the government. Thailand is currently guided by its 9th Plan 
(2002-2006). Fisheries policies are strongly focused on growth i.e. production orientated, as 
a means of poverty reduction. Community based resource management is included as a 
strategy for coastal fisheries resources management, and people participation in natural 
resource and environmental management has been increasingly recognized in recent Plans. 
Guidelines at the national policy level include: 
• Providing opportunities of people and communities to participate in decision 
making, and monitoring and evaluation of public development projects likely to 
have an impact on natural resources and the environment; and 
• Providing legal rights of local communities and small fishers to participate in 
coastal resource management, as well as the conservation, rehabilitation and 
maintenance of mangrove forests, sea grass and coral reefs. 
 
Within the fisheries sector specifically, the DOF Fishery Policy for 2005 has as one of its 
mission statements “Rehabilitate fishery resources to retain their productivity through 
acquiring people’s participation by imbuing conscience”. And a recent action plan to deal with 
tsunami rehabilitation also involves co-management, community involvement and enhanced 
government capacity to respond to needs.  Also of note is the Department of Marine and 
Coastal Resources (DMCR), established within the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment in late 2002. The DMCR published a national coastal management policy in 
2004, and this formally makes provision for community and co-management. 
Co-management is not specifically provided for under principal fisheries legislation, but 
Section 32 of the Fisheries Act 1947 allows the Minister/Governor to issue fishery 
regulations. Other relevant sections are Section 6 (on types of fishing grounds) and Section 7 
(powers of authority for provincial committees), and combined with Section 32 could be 
considered a legal framework allowing for co-management, subject to associated 
regulations. Stakeholders and communities are not yet legally mandated to be involved in 
decision-making processes however, although the DOF has been increasing the scope of its 
consultation processes to include these groups, in accordance with the 1997 Constitution. 
(The 1997 Thai Constitution allows local people to participate in natural resource 
management through local institutions). Under the Thai Fisheries Act 1947, rights can be 
granted to individuals through licences to fish in a “reserved” area, or to individual 
leaseholders bidding for rights to a “leasable” area who then have total rights to that area for 
the assigned period. In general, at the present time there is no legal support for community 
use rights or group’s user rights. However, the draft New Fisheries Law B. E. 2545 provides 
for the involvement of stakeholders in decision making. Under a specific section on 
community-based management, it provides for “designated communities” to have rights to 
harvest aquatic resources within a designated community fishery area, or to be given the 
authority to manage and implement measures related to aquatic resources within a 
designated community fishery area.  However, certain issues raised in the consideration of 
the draft law have to be clarified before it becomes law. 
Implementation and enforcement 
A range of regulations have been passed to control the type and nature of fishing activities in 
both Bays. In Phang Nga Bay, with the adoption by the government of the community-based 
fisheries management approach, some responsibilities for coastal resources management 
have been delegated to coastal villages along the Bay. Village committees, whose members 
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include fisherfolk and village leaders, have been established to implement resources 
management initiatives and decisions emanating from the villagers. In Bang Saphan Bay, 
project staff and local fishers (and sometimes policeman) do the monitoring and enforcement 
of illegal fishing operations. However, by law, only government officers can enforce illegal 
cases, not local fishers. Other concerns have arisen because fishing grounds by fishers from 
different villages may overlap, and so boundaries for resource use rights cannot be set in just 
one small area, for example, in front of each fisher community. In addition, fisher groups are 
most representative of fishers but more informal than “TAOs,” the local government 
organizations. 
Drivers of co-management 
In Phang Nga Bay as a whole there are several NGOs – for example, Wildlife Fund Thailand, 
TACAP, CAA, Small-Scale Fisheries Federation, and the Environmental Conservation 
Association – that have worked to protect coastal resources and environment. Koh Yao Noi 
was also an active group, and built their own patrol boat and worked with DOF on patrols to 
keep the Bay free of trawlers. The CBFM project in Phang-Nga Bay was set up by the 
Andaman Sea Fisheries Development Center (AFDEC) of the Department of Fisheries 
(DOF). 
In Bang Saphan Bay, co-management was implemented by DOF in 1999 to test the rights-
based approach to management. It also resulted from pressure by local fishers i.e. the 
Government had to do something to manage the conflict in the area. 
In both bays, the main motivations for co-management were resource depletion and conflicts 
with trawlers. 
General conclusions 
Co-management is being increasingly recognized in Thai fisheries policy, although it is not 
yet specifically provided for under principal fisheries legislation. Co-management 
arrangements in both Phang-Nga Bay and Bang Saphan Bay have resulted in some 
successes as perceived by the stakeholders themselves. 
However, to delegate fisheries management functions and authorities to any local 
community, it is necessary for government agencies to seek a formal or registered local 
organization to guarantee that they follow administrative regulations and formal procedures. 
Meanwhile fishers are seeking an institution that is properly representative of them and able 
to raise their concerns and interests. In most cases the local fishers’ representative 
institutions are informal or non-registered organizations. Nevertheless, despite some 
continued reticence, government is becoming increasingly receptive to working with local 
fisher organizations and NGOs. 
2.9 Vietnamese reservoirs 
Background information 
In the Province of Daklak in the central highlands of Viet Nam there are more than 200 
reservoirs. Co-management arrangements have been initiated to manage fisheries resources 
in six reservoirs (Ea Soup, Lak, Yang Re, Krong Buk Ha, Nam Nung, and Buon Tria) under 
the Management of River and Reservoir Fisheries in the Lower Mekong Basin Project, 
sponsored by the Mekong River Commission (MRC). Management of River and Reservoir 
Fisheries (MMRF) Component, of the MRC Fisheries Programme began in 1995, and there 
are about 570 fishers in the six reservoirs.  
There are also some forms of co-management and community management in lagoon 
fisheries (e.g. Tam Giang in Thua Thien Hue Province), and co-management arrangements 
have been introduced for improving management of coastal shrimp fisheries and coral reef 
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ecosystems (e.g. Tam Hai Commune – Nui Thanh district, Quang Nam province; Phuoc Dinh 
Commune – Ninh Phuoc district, Thuan province). The FAO project Integrated Management 
of Lagoon Activities in Thua Thien Hue Province is also supporting the establishment and 
implementation of co-management schemes for the fishery sector in the province. 
Policy and legislative setting 
In the final draft “National Strategy for Marine Fisheries Management and Development in 
Viet Nam,” which is expected to be adopted early 2006, one of the principles upon which the 
strategy is based provides for co-management in the following way: 
The Ministry of Fisheries is responsible for overall policy objectives, monitoring the status of 
resources and implementing management actions through Provincial and local fisheries 
management agencies and others as appropriate. In undertaking this function, the Ministry of 
Fisheries will, wherever practicable, adopt a community-based management approach and work 
closely with, and strengthen the role of, local communities in fisheries management. 
 
In addition, the government has approved a programme for aquatic resource protection and 
development to 2010, which adopts many of the same principles and refers to the FAO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and participatory approaches to fishery management. 
In addition the draft strategy for offshore fishing, the Sustainable Aquaculture in Poverty 
Alleviation (SAPA) Strategy and Implementation Programme, and the Fishery Sector Annex 
of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (CPRGS), all 
emphasize the need for grass-roots level participation in decision-making processes with 
regards to management of the fishery sector and sometimes explicitly mention co-
management or community based management. 
The Fisheries Law of 2003 (Law No. 17/2003/qh 11) provides for co-management. 
Regarding the management of fishing grounds, the law provides that “The provincial 
People’s Committees (…) shall organize and promote the local residents to take part in 
monitoring, detection and prosecution of any violations committed to fisheries activities in 
fishing grounds”. (Art. 15.4). Furthermore, regarding the rights of organizations and 
individuals engaged in fishing operations, there is a provision stating that “They shall have 
other rights as provided for by legislation.” (Art. 20), which, in being so general, can point to 
any rights, including those associated with co-management. The concept of co-management 
is also provided for in the Draft Government Decree on the management of fishing 
operations conducted by Vietnamese organizations and individuals in all marine areas:  “The 
People’s Committee of coastal provinces shall have the duties as follows:(…) Delegate the 
management power of coastal fisheries resources to district’s and ward’s People’s 
Committees; encourage the community-based management model for the management of 
coastal fisheries resources.” (Art. 19.4). 
The Ordinance on the Tasks and Authority of People’s Councils and People’s Committees of 
1996 details the functions of such councils and committees at all levels (provincial, district 
and communal). People’s Councils at all levels are granted authority on planning and policy 
lines. Among other things, they can decide on measures to develop fisheries in accordance 
with guidelines from upper echelons. 
The Vietnamese leadership has promoted a number of political reform policies related to 
decentralization although there is no non-sectoral legislation dealing specifically with 
decentralization. So far, effort has focused on deconcentration. “Grassroots democracy” 
encourages popular participation in planning, management and supervision of local 
government’s projects. And the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee (IX 
Congress) March 2002 focuses on the commune level and provides, inter alia, for the 
promotion of grassroots democracy and the clarification of the functions of the commune, 
including its role in the budgetary process, land administration, and tax collection. 
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The Fisheries Law of 2003 also deals with decentralization, and provides that “the 
Government shall identify the border of coastal areas in order to decentralize management to 
local coastal authorities for integrated coastal areas management” (Article 5.4). With regard 
to inland areas, it stipulates that “the Government shall plan, establish, manage and 
decentralize the inland protected areas” (Article 9.2). It further specifies that “Provincial 
People’s Committee shall issue the management rule of protected areas to be decentralized 
to the local authorities for management in accordance with guidance provided by the Ministry 
of Fisheries” (Article 9.2). The Fisheries Law of 2003 also provides for the transfer of certain 
authority from the central Government to Provincial People’s Committees. 
Implementation and enforcement 
To be able to manage reservoir resources effectively, fishers have developed regulations to 
control fishing practices; in many cases these included prohibiting non-sustainable fishing 
methods. Penalties have included fines and confiscation of gear. Consistent enforcement 
against violators has been important. In practice, monitoring and enforcement has depended 
on the fishers’ unions, often with some support from local police forces. Some fishers’ groups 
have also stocked their reservoirs, as an additional way of increasing yields. 
Theoretically implementation could be enhanced/supported under The Fisheries Law, which 
provides for the establishment of a fund for rehabilitation of fisheries resources (art.10) and 
allows for Government to make regulations for its usage, including for the purpose of for 
purposes of fisheries resources rehabilitation. Such regulations have to date not been 
adopted, but could potentially be used a source of revenue supporting decentralization and 
co-management within the scope of rehabilitation of fisheries resources. 
Drivers of co-management 
Co-management in the reservoirs covered in this case study was principally driven by donors 
and the MRC, but local fishers/stakeholders have been supportive. Elaboration of the 
National Strategy for Marine Fisheries Management and Development in Viet Nam, which 
provides for co-management, was largely driven by the Ministry of Fisheries (MOFI), with the 
Research Institute Marine Fisheries in particular leading the process. Backstopping for this 
initiative was provided at MOFI’s request by the FAO FishCode Programme and the DANIDA 
Fishery Sector Programme Support (FSPS). 
General conclusions 
Legislation provides a good framework for co-management. Its broad and flexible nature can 
be elaborated in subsidiary legislation. Up to the present time, however, there has been no 
elaboration of the Fisheries Law (i.e. there is no implementing subsidiary legislation) on the 
relevant aspects of how co-management is to be operationalized. Fisheries policy will also be 
supportive on approval of the new National Strategy for Marine Fisheries Management and 
Development. 
Co-management schemes in Viet Nam are still in a trial/test phase. Developments have been 
strongly supported by external initiatives, and have not evolved sufficiently on their own. In 
the reservoir fisheries in this case study, while managing the fisheries was the initial focus for 
the fishers’ groups, the benefit from this was not sufficient to justify the time and money 
members invested in their organization; assurance of mutual welfare quickly became an 
equally important objective. The lack of funds to carry out planned activities was one issue 
that arose in fishers’ group meetings. All the groups had plans to finance their activities 
through taxation and/or various sorts of contributions from the members; however, these 
sources alone were insufficient to meet costs. If public agencies wish to promote co-
management, they may therefore need to be ready to devolve reasonable funding. 
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2.10 Fiji 
Background information 
Fiji consists of about 844 islands and islets. Most of Fiji’s coastal waters are less than 70 m 
in inshore areas, and characterized by coral reefs. Water depth increases to 200-300 m 
outside the reef areas, then descends more gradually to the abyssal zone with waters deeper 
than 2 500 m.  The main ecosystems are typical of those of other Pacific Islands: fringing 
reefs, barrier reefs, seagrass beds, mangroves, mud flats, estuaries, sandy areas, and areas 
of non-consolidated rubble. Main resources exploited by coastal communities are finfish, 
beche-de-mer, octopus, seaweed, lobster, mud crab, and various bivalve molluscs. Offshore 
tuna resources are exploited by industrial tuna vessels. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Although commercial fishing has increased in Fiji, an increasing number of customary fishing 
owners are now restricting the number of licences issued for fishing in their qoliqoli 
(traditional fishing areas) due to growing awareness of the need to consider the interests of 
all members in the use of the qoliqoli. As a result of such concern, community-based 
fisheries management, which utilizes the communities’ ownership over fishing rights areas, 
has begun to take root in Fiji. The movement has expanded through the initiatives of NGOs, 
institutions and other conservation agencies. Community-based management developed by 
NGOs and other institutions has been established in areas known as Locally Managed 
Marine Areas (LMMA). The recently established Fiji LMMA network (FLMMA), a collaborative 
effort among Government authorities, NGOs, learning institutions, conservation practitioners 
and communities has added impetus to the community-based fisheries movement in Fiji. 
Recently, the Fisheries Department has pursued its objective of implementing LMMA’s 
management plans at the national level to enable the community-based management 
initiatives to have a wider influence and impact. This initiative was incorporated into the 
strategies and policies of the Department of Fisheries for the 2002-2006 period. A new and 
encouraging development is that the Government has decided that it will grant ownership of 
the foreshore areas to indigenous Fijians through legislation, and has produced draft 
legislation to this effect. If this undertaking is implemented, it will remove the controversy 
over the ownership of the qoliqoli (see discussion below) and should give further impetus to 
the community management movement in Fiji. The recently completed registration of all 
claims over marine areas by mataqali and the LMMA system driven by the FLMMA, 
strengthens the movement for community fisheries management based on customary marine 
tenure in Fiji. 
Compared with many Pacific Island countries, Fiji has had a longer history of dealing with 
and implementing customary marine tenure (CMT). The recognition of CMT rights in law 
dates back to the mid-1800s and the cessation of Fiji to Britain in 1874. The Deed of 
Cessation promises that the rights and interests of the ceding parties, the High Chiefs, shall 
be recognized, in so far as they are consistent with British Sovereignty and the colonial form 
of government.  
The Fisheries Act 1992 is the principle fisheries legislation for the management of marine 
resources in Fiji. Features of the Act relevant to community/co-management are: 
 
• the recognition of traditional use rights in traditional fishing areas and their 
exclusive use to members of the mataqali. 
• the provisions which establish a Native Fisheries Commission charged with the 
duty of ascertaining the customary fishing rights in each province of Fiji (The 
Commission has now determined and registered all traditional fishing areas 
(qoliqoli) totalling 410 parcels). 
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• Entry into fisheries is regulated primarily by the fishing license system. 
• Pursuant to the legal situation established under the provisions of the Birds, 
Game and Fish Protection Ordinance as contained in the Fisheries Act, fishing in 
traditional fishing areas (the qoliqolis) is exclusive to the members of the vanua 
(the largest grouping of kinmenship) and yavasu (the next social group down the 
scale from the vanua). Any fishing that is to take place in the qoliqolis by non-
members of the vanua and yavusa is possible only under permit granted by the 
District Commissioner, based on the approval of the Chief responsible for the 
qoliqoli. To obtain a permit, the person approaches the Chief, who will consider 
the request. Upon approval, the Chief grants a letter of consent which is taken to 
the District Commissioner, who then grants the permit upon verification of 
ownership. 
 
The result of the legal framework is that Fiji’s coastal waters and foreshore areas and use 
rights are shared under a dual ownership system. The ownership of the foreshore, including 
all land below the high-water mark (the seabed) and extending to its territorial limits and 
continental shelf, rests with the State. The State exercises sovereign rights in the area 
beyond its territorial limits in the exclusive economic zone. The rights of Fijians are confined 
to exclusive fishing rights in the recognized customary fishing grounds, including those 
fringing reefs on the coastal waters and around isolated islands. The Fisheries Act is 
interpreted to mean that the right of the vanua to fish in the traditional fishing area is 
exclusive (Fong 1994), and this is confirmed by current practice.  
Implementation and enforcement 
Few funds are specifically allocated to the agencies responsible for the management of 
coastal resources, for the purpose of coastal resource management (most funding has been 
oriented to export-oriented resource development and infrastructure projects). Of the 117 
staff in the Fisheries Division, none are assigned specifically to coastal resource 
management. Government support in terms of resource allocation to lower level initiatives in 
coastal resource management is also low.  The Fisheries Division is however sympathetic to 
supporting lower level initiatives in coastal resource management, although officials indicate 
they do not have the human or financial resources to work easily at the village level. 
Customary fishing areas and the right to regulate use and exploitation in that area belong to 
different, but closely related social groups, namely the vanua, and the yavusa. People within 
these groups are expected to use their own customary fishing area location. Those from 
outside the group who wish to use the customary fishing area of another group must obtain 
permission of the owners (see relevant features of the Fisheries Act 1992 above). Owners of 
customary fishing areas may establish closed areas to preserve the resources for an 
intended purpose. Decisions of a group are conveyed through social channels of 
communication, which ensures that all interested parties are made aware of such decisions. 
Enforcement of decisions and traditional management measures is ensured by traditional 
authority and through strict adherence to protocols. Compliance with management measures 
is normally assured through the combined effect of respect for the Fijian traditional authority 
system (the Chiefly system), respect for tradition, and reverence for sacred grounds or the 
supernatural, which require adherence to certain rules or practices. Contraventions of 
established management measures attract harsh punishments. 
General conclusions 
Key strengths of the national policy and legislative framework include the following. 
• There is legal recognition of community rights to manage coastal resources. 
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• Senior coastal resource managers have recently been sensitized to the needs 
and benefits of coastal resource management, and there has been a substantial 
amount of training of resource managers in the recent past. 
• Substantial donor interest exists for supporting community-based coastal 
resource management. 
• Legal incorporation of traditional decision-making institutions, and better still, the 
actual recognition of traditional fishing rights in legislation, indicates a continued 
relevance of and respect for culture and tradition in Fiji. This has largely 
contributed to the success of community-based fisheries management initiatives, 
based on customary marine tenure. 
• Present moves to grant ownership over foreshore areas to indigenous Fijians, 
through policy and legislation, would further assure the continuation of traditional 
forms of fisheries management, through community based management. 
 
Key weaknesses of the national policy and legislative framework are as follows. 
• National agencies have failed either to allocate sufficient funds for, or place 
sufficient priority on, coastal resource management. 
• There are indigenous institutions for local coastal resource management, but the 
national government agencies do not place much emphasis on supporting those 
institutions. In other words, the situation is still more one of community than co-
management. 
• Decisions by the Chief to grant access for commercial fishing operations to non-
members of the vanua may not be in the long term interest of the members of the 
vanua. 
2.11 Samoa 
Background information 
Samoa is an oceanic volcanic archipelago in the south-west Pacific. There are two main 
islands, Upolu and Savaii, seven smaller islands (two of which are inhabited), and several 
islets and rock outcrops. The country has a total land area of 2 839 km2 and an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of 120 000 km2, one of the smallest in the Pacific area. Fringing reefs 
and barrier reefs enclosing shallow lagoons surround most of the islands. There are 
approximately 23 100 ha of reef and lagoon area with depths of less than 50 m, as well as    
1 000 ha of mangrove and swampy areas. Most coastal ecosystems found in other parts of 
the Pacific Islands are also found in Samoa. Finfish (especially surgeonfish, grouper, mullet, 
carangids, rabbit fish), octopus, giant clams, beche-de-mer, turbo, and crab are the main 
target species of coastal communities, and offshore tuna resources are exploited by 
industrial vessels. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Coastal resource management is covered in the national development plans and there is 
strong government support to community-based management in Samoa.  Also of interest, 
and reflecting the Government’s overall interest in co-management, are recent developments 
to co-manage commercial tuna fisheries. The remainder of this case study focuses on 
coastal/inshore community/co-management, but some information on co-management of 
commercial fisheries is provided in Box 1 below. 
Under Article 104 of Samoa’s Constitution, all land lying below the line of high water is 
vested in the State and all Samoans have equal access to these areas. This right is 
regulated by the Fisheries Act 1988 which is the principal legislative framework relating to 
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fisheries in Samoa and provides a system for distributing access rights to fishers guaranteed 
by the Constitution. Traditional law is still widely used in Samoa and can be the most 
effective way of conserving and managing coastal areas.  Village Councils have principal 
control over the majority of coastal lands.  
The Fisheries Act (1988) and the Local Fisheries Regulations (1995) facilitate the 
conservation and protection of marine breeding and feeding areas as well as integrating the 
sustainable development of marine resources into environmental planning and assessment. 
The Village Fono Act 1990 formally recognizes the Village Fono (council) by validating and 
empowering the exercise of power and authority by Village Fono in accordance with the 
custom and usage of their villages. Notably however, powers are only accorded to people 
living in the village. An important provision of the Fisheries Act 1988 is that the Director 
responsible for fisheries “…may, in consultation with fishermen, industry and village 
representatives, prepare and promulgate by-laws not inconsistent with this Act for the 
conservation and management of fisheries”. The ingenious use of this provision, in 
connection with the Village Fono Act and the underlying relevance of indigenous socio-
political and decision-making institutions, has allowed co-/community-based fisheries 
management to become well established in Samoa. Many villages now have by-laws to 
assist in managing village fishing grounds. 
Box 1.  Co-management of Samoan commercial tuna fisheries 
Characteristics of the fishery 
The commercial fishery in Samoa has expanded rapidly since 1995, when horizontal longline 
gear was introduced to capture large tunas, albacore, yellowfin and bigeye, for export. Exports of 
tuna have increased from 2 092 metric tonnes, valued at US$4 million in 1996, to 4 505 metric  
tonnes, valued at US$13 million, in 2000. The industry employs over 500 people and is the major 
export earner of the country. 
Problems 
However, although the tuna fishing industry has contributed substantially to the economy of 
Samoa, its rapid expansion created many problems for both the private and the public sectors. 
Thirty-three lives were lost at sea between 1997 and 2000 due to the lack of seamanship skills, 
lack of basic safety equipment, and poor vessel construction. Considerable quantities of fish 
were being rejected due to poor on-board handling of the catch and lack of adequate onshore 
facilities to process and store the catch properly, and the mooring facilities were inadequate to 
deal with the considerable increase in the number of fishing vessels.  
Solutions 
The Government of Samoa, in an attempt to address some of these problems, developed a 
national radio communications system for mariners and imposed regulations concerning 
construction, safety equipment and manning requirements for fishing vessels. But the 
government wanted to involve the industry in the process of making decisions towards managing 
the tuna fishery, as the fishers and other user groups had a better understanding of the needs 
and concerns. In September 1999, Samoa, with assistance from an AusAID-funded project, 
established a co-management system. The aim was to achieve closer consultation with the 
stakeholders and greater awareness of fisheries resource management issues, and to provide 
the opportunity for all stakeholders to have direct input into the fisheries management decision-
making process. As a result of this interaction and consultation with the stakeholders, greater 
awareness, acceptance and ownership of fisheries management arrangements have been 
achieved. Perhaps most important has been the joint development of a tuna management plan, 
and the creation of a commercial fisheries extension service (CFES) in 1999 within the Fisheries 
Division of Samoa. To meet the needs of the fishing industry and government departments in 
Samoa, the CFES has: supported Samoa's Commercial Fisheries Management Advisory 
Committee (CF-MAC); promoted management strategies to ensure the sustainability of the tuna 
fishing industry; promoted the enforcement of the sea safety regulations for the tuna fishing 
industry; facilitated training for the fishing industry; identified infrastructure requirements and 
facilitated their implementation; and disseminated information concerning development and 
management of the fishing industry. 
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Implementation and enforcement 
Government officials state that there has been a recent move to channel more resources into 
the management of coastal fisheries.  About 20 of the Fisheries Division’s 40 staff and four of 
the Division of Environment and Conservation’s 12 staff, work on coastal resource 
management issues. Much of the current government support to lower-level coastal resource 
management occurs through participation in partnership programmes, some of which are 
externally funded. The government also supports community-level initiatives through the 
assistance it provides in the formulation and approval of village by-laws. 
In Samoa, many important decisions are made according to, or are influenced by, what is 
referred to as the Samoan way (Fa'a Samoa). Fa’a Samoa, founded on custom, is 
perpetuated by the continued relevance of the traditional forms of social groupings and 
decision-making institutions, particularly the Matai (Chiefly) system and the Village Fono 
(Council). The Village Fono decides on all matters pertaining to the village and its land and 
sea resources. Decisions are reached by consensus following a great deal of discussion by 
concerned parties. Fono decisions are based more on a sense of social justice, custom and 
usage than written laws and regulations, although as noted above many villages now have 
by-laws to assist in managing village fishing grounds.  
In the mid-1980s, over-exploitation, use of destructive fishing methods and environmental 
disturbance caused serious declines in catches in the inshore fisheries. The situation was of 
concern not only to the Government, but also to a large number of the village communities. 
Village communities through their Village Fono took initiatives to make village rules and 
publicize these rules through media to prevent further decline of their fishery resources. 
Notices announced bans on the use of explosives, chemicals and other destructive fishing 
techniques and prohibited nearby villages to fish in their respective lagoon areas. The 
notices also indicated penalties to be paid to the Fono for any breach of their village rules by 
their own residents, and threats of legal action for breach of by-laws by outsiders. 
The use of by-laws noted above has often been the direct result of problems with the 
enforcement of village rules for outsiders (and comes as no surprise as the jurisdiction of the 
Village Fono, according to Section 9, is to make laws that apply only to persons who 
ordinarily reside in the village). Problems of enforcement also arose owing to the 
inconsistency of some village rules to manage and conserve fishery resources with existing 
Government laws. This resulted in several Fono not being able to pursue court action against 
breaches by neighbouring villages. 
The mechanism for introducing village by-laws under the Fisheries Act also ensures that the 
village rules apply equally to village residents and outsiders and no Samoans can be 
differentially excluded as was the case under the Village Fono Act. The advantage of village 
rules in the form of by-laws under the Fisheries Act is that they can now be enforced in a 
court of competent jurisdiction like any other national law of Samoa. 
Current village by-laws are broad and cover any measure that assists the management and 
conservation of the fishery resources. These may include the restriction of the sizes of fish 
and shellfish (but not lower than the minimum limits in the Fisheries Regulations 1996), bans 
on certain types of fishing gear and methods, allocation of fish quotas, restriction of mesh 
sizes for nets and fish traps (but not lower than the minimum limits in the Fisheries 
Regulations 1996) and closure of fishing seasons or areas to allow fish to reproduce. 
Monitoring and enforcement of the by-laws is largely undertaken by village communities. The 
communities normally put signboards along roadsides and beaches to inform the public of 
the areas only where their respective by-laws apply. Communities variously build watch 
houses, patrol using canoes and routinely use watchers to monitor illegal activities in their 
coastal zones and marine protected areas. Breaches by individuals from the village 
sponsoring the by-laws are dealt with by the Village Fono. Traditional fines such as provision 
of pigs, taro and others may be imposed by the Fono, and village Fono penalties imposed on 
law breakers can be more severe than those provided by national law and range from fines 
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to ostracism from the village in extreme cases. Breaches by an outsider are handled through 
the formal court system. 
General conclusions 
Key strengths of the national policy and legislative framework include the following. 
• Strong village government. 
• Support from national government to lower level initiatives, especially through the 
by-law process. 
• The involvement of communities ensures that by-laws concerning fisheries 
management are monitored more effectively than the monitoring and 
enforcement of regular national laws, which are severely compromised by limited 
resources and personnel of the Government. By-laws are initiated by villages and 
people with real interest in the management and conservation of the fishery 
resources in question. 
• Village by-laws are now an important feature of village Fisheries Management 
Plans created under the community-based Fisheries Extension Programme 
operated in Samoa. 
• Donor interest. 
• Community-based management is now a permanent feature of fisheries 
management in Samoa supported by the Community Fisheries Support Section 
of the Fisheries Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and 
Meteorology. 
 
Key weaknesses of the national policy and legislative framework are: 
• Conflict between village perceptions of limited access to marine areas and the 
Constitutional provision for open-access. 
• Possible use of Fono-imposed sanctions on Fono members based on custom 
that may be effective but are unconstitutional. 
2.12 Cook Islands 
Background information 
The Cook Islands is an archipelagic state comprising 15 widely scattered islands with a total 
land area of 237 sq. km., distributed in an EEZ of over 1.8 million sq. km.  There are no 
major bodies of freshwater in the Cook Islands. Marine fishing and mariculture activities are 
therefore the dominant components of the fisheries sector. 
The Cook Islands’ marine fisheries include extensive subsistence and artisanal harvesting of 
a wide variety of coastal/inshore reef and lagoon fish and invertebrate species, as well as a 
small longline fishery for tuna, and the commercial collection of ornamental fish for the 
aquarium market. A total of over 400 species of bony fish are found on the reefs and 
lagoons, the majority of which are taken by various fishing techniques.  According to the 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, the important finfish families are Holocentridae, Mullidae, 
Mugilidae, Scaridae, Chaetodontidae, Acanthuridae, and Labridae.  Also important are the 
gastropods (especially trochus and turbo), bivalves (especially giant clams and pearl 
oysters), echinoderms (especially beche-de-mer and sea urchins), one species of lobster, 
and seaweeds. 
In the Northern Group and in the smaller islands of the Southern Group, fishing remains 
largely subsistence in nature and is mostly conducted from small outboard-powered craft and 
canoes in the lagoons and along the outer reef edge. Bottom handlining, spearing, gill 
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netting, scoop-netting of flying fish and reef gleaning for invertebrates are common activities 
throughout the group. In addition to subsistence harvesting, small-scale commercial fishing 
occurs in the more populated southern islands, particularly Rarotonga and Aitutaki where 
urban populations and tourism have created a strong demand for fresh fish and seafood.  A 
fleet of 70 or more small craft, mostly wooden skiffs from 4.5 to 6 metres and powered by 40 
to 80 horsepower outboard engines, conducts FAD-based fishing off Rarotonga. These 
vessels, most of which operate on a part-time or occasional basis, carry out a variety of 
fishing methods, including scoop-netting for flying fish, trolling, mid-water fishing with vertical 
longlines, and drop-stone fishing. 
Policy and legislative setting 
Although the formally instituted administrative and management framework enables the 
Ministry of Marine Resources (MMR) to be actively involved in managing coastal/inshore 
fisheries through the “Designated Fisheries” and “Local Fisheries Committee” mechanisms, 
the prevailing practice of MMR has been to allow coastal fisheries to be managed by Island 
Councils through promulgation of by-laws – a third pillar for coastal fisheries management 
recognized under the principal fisheries legislation. Island Councils therefore take initiatives 
in fisheries management while MMR plays a coordinating and supporting role particularly in 
providing technical assistance. 
Decentralization or devolution of powers to outer islands has been central to the policy and 
strategy of the Cook Islands Government for years since 1966.  Much of this policy or 
strategy is manifested in the planning process, practice, and the institutional framework 
established for implementing decentralization. The Government established three 
overarching goals under its national development policy: (i) maintaining macroeconomic 
stability to sustain private sector growth; (ii) empowering people of the outer islands by 
advancing the principles of good governance; and (iii) advancing social justice through equal 
access to basic services and reduction of national disparities. The Government also 
identified five strategic priorities: (i) economic sustainability; (ii) outer island empowerment; 
(iii) social cohesiveness; (iv) infrastructure advancement; and (v) good governance. 
The role and functions of the formally recognized institutions representing the islands – the 
Island Councils - are stated in the Rarotonga Local Government Act (for the Island of 
Rarotonga) and the Outer Islands Local Government Act 1987. Many members of the Island 
Councils that are elected to hold offices are often traditional Chiefs and other titled persons.  
The significance and role of the Island Councils in local governance is consolidated by the 
establishment of the Ministry of Outer Islands Development in 1994.  Consolidation in 
respect of fisheries management came in the form of the Marine Resources Act 1989.  
The powers provided under the principal fisheries legislation for MMR to act in managing 
coastal fisheries particularly in form of Island Councils powers to enact by-laws for fisheries 
management and the decentralized powers of the Island Councils, provide a framework for 
cooperative management for coastal fisheries. Indeed, co-management in fisheries in the 
Cook Islands has been initiated by the Islands Councils and largely involves the use of Ra’ui, 
a traditional form of community-based resource management that has similarities to marine 
reserves whereby the harvesting of marine species in an area is prohibited for a designated 
period.  In the context of this cooperative system, MMR’s role is to perform a facilitating, 
coordinating and support services to traditional conservation. The most important 
contribution of MMR to the Island Councils’ initiative is in providing technical and scientific 
data through research and surveys on resources in areas under Ra’ui. It is noted that the 
Ra’ui system in the Cook Islands has been successful because it received such support from 
MMR and that this relationship and support will continue in the future. 
The Marine Resources Act 1989 (and its implementing regulations) is the principal act 
supporting co-management. The Act governs the management of fishing primarily through 
the mechanisms of designated fisheries and management plans, and the control of fishing by 
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both domestic and foreign fishing vessels through licensing. The relevant features of the 
Marine Resources Act are the provisions relating to designated fisheries, local fisheries 
committees and the establishment and functions of the Island Councils. The most significant 
provisions with respect to Island Councils are the powers of Island Councils to: recommend 
the promulgation of by-laws; declare seasons (which further reinforces the traditional 
conservation and management system of the Raui); and, issue licences.  Complementary 
legislation that establishes the co-management units (Islands Councils) are the 
decentralization laws in the form of the Rarotonga Local Government Act and the Outer 
Islands Local Government Act mentioned above. 
Implementation and enforcement 
Contravention of by-laws, the closed seasons declared, and the terms of the licences issued 
by the Island Councils, are criminal offences under the Marine Resources Act and can be 
enforced by the designated enforcement authority under the Act.  However, as the principal 
form of community management initiated by the Island Councils is the traditional resource 
conservation and management tool the Ra’ui, it is not enforced through the formal law 
enforcement system. Compliance is achieved through community pressure and respect for 
customs which are perpetuated by legal recognition and continued role of traditional 
governance institutions. For example in the outer islands of Pukapuka, the village laws or 
village-imposed Ra’ui are endorsed by the legally established Island Council. The offenders 
of these laws and Ra’ui are subjected to traditional forms of sanctions. Opportunity exists to 
impose fines and other penalties under Island Council bylaws or national laws but it appears 
that it is often unnecessary to resort to this option due to a high incidence of compliance or 
effectiveness of traditional sanctions. 
General conclusions 
Key strengths of the national policy and legislative framework include the following. 
• National policies explicitly emphasize outer Island and people empowerment, 
social cohesiveness and good governance. 
• Recognition and accommodation of traditional units of governance and 
Composition of Island Councils influenced by traditional systems of governance 
ensures relevance of formal systems of governance. 
• Fisheries management laws establish clear relationships with pre-existing 
decentralized units of government, the Island Councils, and provide a clear role 
for them to play in fisheries management. 
• Involvement of communities through Island Councils ensures that by-laws 
concerning fisheries management are monitored more effectively than the 
monitoring and enforcement of regular national laws. 
• Formal sanctions act as a default enforcement mechanism should traditional 
sanctions fail. 
• Traditional forms of management and other coastal management initiatives by 
the Island Councils are a permanent feature of fisheries management in the Cook 
Islands. 
 
Key weaknesses of the national policy and legislative framework are: 
• Possible over-reliance on the continued relevance of informal traditional 
management measures and sanctions. 
• Reactionary rather than nonintrusive but proactive nature of the MMR policy for 
providing advice and assistance to Island Councils. 
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2.13 Vanuatu 
Background information 
Vanuatu is a Y-shaped archipelago of about 80 islands, 67 of which are inhabited, and 12 of 
which are considered major. The islands, plus their associated reefs, lie between latitudes 
13–21°S and longitudes 166–172°E in the western Pacific Ocean. The archipelago measures 
approximately 850 km in length. The undisputed portion on Vanuatu’s exclusive economic 
zone covers 680 000 km2. Compared to other Pacific Island countries, inshore marine areas 
are not extensive. Inner reef areas are limited to narrow fringing reefs and the area covered 
by mangroves is quite small. Vanuatu’s fisheries resources are exploited at the subsistence, 
artisanal and industrial levels. 
Subsistence activities include coastal line and net fishing targeting demersal and small 
pelagic reef and lagoon fish, as well as reef gleaning and collection of shellfish and other 
invertebrates. Most of the catch is for home consumption or family distribution, but where 
markets or handling and distribution facilities exist some part of the catch may be sold. The 
subsistence fishery is becoming increasingly cash-oriented around urban areas, with varying 
portions of the catch being sold. Trochus and beche-de-mer are also collected in a low-
technology, labour-intensive manner characteristic of subsistence fishing. However these 
species are sold and form a valuable portion of Vanuatu’s marine export products.  
Large scale fishing operations include a sporadic domestic tuna longline fishery operation 
and industrial tuna fishing by foreign fishing fleets under bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements. Inland fisheries in Vanuatu are limited and essentially carried out for 
subsistence purposes. They involve the occasional capture of small quantities of freshwater 
prawns and eels in Vanuatu’s few rivers and streams. They are of little commercial 
significance. 
Policy and legislative setting 
One of the main objectives underlying fisheries development and management in Vanuatu, 
paraphrased from the Third National Development Plan, is to maximize the economic returns 
and other benefits from the exploitation of marine resources to the people of Vanuatu, 
particularly the indigenous population. 
The Department of Fisheries’ 1997 draft Policy Statement contains a number of objectives, 
but none relate to community/co-management, except in a commitment “…to provide 
technical support to provincial and local government bodies, to the private sector, and to 
other agencies in the execution of fisheries projects.” Nevertheless, the government’s 
management strategy nominally consists of two major elements: for the commercial fisheries, 
the use of formal fisheries management plans; and, for the subsistence and village based 
fisheries, devolution of management responsibility to local communities.  
The government’s policies and strategies are consistent with the overarching legislated 
policies of Vanuatu enshrined in the Constitution and other fundamental laws as rights and 
principles.  These are: “…all land in the Republic belongs to the indigenous custom owners 
and their descendents” (“... land extending to the seaside of any foreshore reef but no 
further”); and, “Customary law shall continue to have effect as a part of the law of the 
Republic.” 
The Fisheries Act 1982 is the principal fisheries legislation that establishes the 
administrative, management and enforcement framework for fisheries in Vanuatu. However, 
the foundation for decentralization and community or village-based management is found in 
the Constitution supported by the Land Reform Act, the Decentralization and Local 
Government Regions Act 1994.  Other key legislation that impacts on community-based 
fisheries management are the Maritime Zones Act 1981and the Environmental Management 
and Conservation Act 2002. 
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The Constitution of Vanuatu establishes a national government and decentralized and local 
governments.  This decentralized system of government is elaborated in the Decentralization 
and Local Government Regions Act 1994 (the Decentralization Act).  The Decentralization 
Act vests powers in regional governments to make laws within the provincial boundaries 
which may apply to areas that extend to and beyond the foreshore reef. The Act and its 
amendments are administered by the provincial councils and the Department of Local 
Authorities within the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
The recently enacted Environmental Management and Conservation Act 2002 empowers the 
Director of the department responsible for environment to negotiate with custom land- 
owners to protect and register community conservation areas. The Fisheries Act empowers 
the Minister for Fisheries to establish marine reserves. This creates a situation where the 
national government (and between authorities within the national government), provincial 
governments and land owning groups have shared powers in respect of natural resources 
conservation and management. Under this situation, questions arise as to which laws apply 
and prevail over the others. 
Although village-based management is an effective system and is now an important feature 
of the extension programme of the Department of Fisheries, the system and its custom-
based measures have received de facto recognition only. 
Implementation and enforcement 
Co-management in Vanuatu is in the form of village-based marine resource management, 
which began in 1990.  The initiative grew from a modest village-based trochus management 
programme of the Department of Fisheries to include the promotion of turtle conservation 
and as an entry point for dissemination of other socio-economic issues that impact on village 
lives. Villages that expressed an interest in village-based fisheries management were 
assisted by the Department of Fisheries to promulgate custom-based conservation taboos 
including closures for various species, restrictions on fishing methods, an awareness of the 
relationship between excessive fishing pressure and declining stocks, the benefits of recent 
regulations on fishing, and the rights to exclude outsiders from fishing.  Such custom-based 
taboos are not only the foundation for all village-based marine resources management 
measures in Vanuatu but also contribute to the equitable distribution of the harvest and 
spreads fishing effort. 
Enforcement of marine resource taboos imposed by the villages ranges from simple 
admonition to fines in the form of money, food and kava or a combination of the three. Where 
reverence of traditional authority is still high, compliance with taboos is achieved for fear of 
shame and embarrassment at being caught and fined in a village court. 
In a 2001 a survey of the marine resource activities in 21 villages observed that village-based 
marine management measures more than doubled between 1993 and 2001. In addition to 
the continuation of the extension work of the Fisheries Department in the villages which 
ensured an increase in the marine resources management activities, the increase in 
awareness for better conservation and management of fisheries resources was also 
attributed to the spread of awareness by a traveling theatre group called Wan Smolbag. 
While custom-based measures, perpetuated by legal recognition of custom owners’ title over 
certain marine areas, is the foundation for the success of marine resources management 
activities in villages, it is not the only reason for the continued success. Cultural norms 
including respect for others and their areas, and respect for rural community organization 
leadership and collective behaviour, allows for non- intrusion into taboo areas. In addition, 
most of the taboo areas are small and located close to villages, which facilitates surveillance. 
Recently, support in enforcing traditional Chiefs’ rulings has been provided by the police in 
cases where the Chief had exhausted other possibilities within the village. 
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General conclusions 
Key strengths of the national policy and legislative framework are: 
• The Constitution as the foundation for decentralization, land ownership (including 
marine area ownership) and custom perpetuates decentralization and co-
management. 
• Recognition or accommodation of traditional units of governance is also 
guaranteed under the constitution. 
• Traditional villages and leaders continue to be the basis for socio-political 
organization which contributes effective monitoring and enforcement of village 
based conservation and management measures. 
 
Key weaknesses of the national policy and legislative framework include: 
• Overlap and conflict of mandates for resource conservation between government 
agencies responsible for fisheries and the environment, and between the 
decentralized government units and the villages. 
• No legal recognition for village-based management measures so as to ensure 
enforcement against non-members of the village. 
 
3. SUMMARY OF MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE STUDIES 
3.1 Introduction 
The case studies presented in Section 2 cover a wide range of countries and types of 
fisheries, from small island States with small populations (e.g. Fiji and Samoa), through large 
countries with significant populations, (e.g. India, Indonesia). They examine both inland 
fisheries (Viet Nam, Cambodia), and marine fisheries (Sri Lanka, Thailand and others). The 
case studies mostly profile small-scale fisheries, although some mention of commercial co-
management of tuna fisheries is made in Samoa. In other case studies (Thailand) co-
management arrangements are predominantly motivated by a desire to restrict the activities 
of larger commercial trawlers in areas being fished by small-scale fishers. 
In general, and with the notable exception of Japan, pilot/demonstration scale co-
management programmes have been gathering pace since the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
However, in many countries community management of fisheries resources, or informal co-
management between government and resource users have been in practice for many 
decades/centuries. In almost all cases, primary motivations for co-/community-management 
have been resource conservation and conflict management. 
Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) noted how much of the relevant literature has focused on the 
community level regarding issues of local organization, community-based management 
processes and development interventions, but that much less has been written about the role 
and activities of government. Our case studies suggest that co-management is still much 
less in evidence than is community management, although it is gathering momentum. For co-
management in the wider sense to become more of a reality, governments in the region must 
establish appropriate legislation and policy frameworks, and more fully engage in the 
process. The establishment of appropriate government policies and enabling legal 
environments are essential in efforts to both sustain existing local level fisheries 
management systems and/or to develop new co-management systems. 
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The text below attempts to draw out some key conclusions and lessons learned from the 
case studies in Section 2, focusing specifically on an enabling policy and legislative 
framework for co-management. As such, the lessons learned are especially relevant to 
government given its primary role in establishing such frameworks, although of course they 
are also relevant to other stakeholders in terms advocacy and involvement in policy and 
legislative processes.  
3.2 A policy framework supportive of fisheries co-management 
Decentralization 
The role of decentralization in economic development, poverty reduction and co-
management has been widely championed in recent years, because it is thought to be a 
mechanism of “inclusion” and “empowerment.” By bringing government closer to the 
governed, it should encourage government to be more knowledgeable about, and hence 
more responsive to, the needs of the poorest and marginalized people. 
Ostrom (1990, 1992) however considered it of only medium importance in terms of 
successful community management, and Bene and Nieland (2004) argue that its beneficial 
impacts on poverty reduction in common-pool resource management systems may be more 
questionable. They do however acknowledge that decentralization does appear to increase 
cooperation between government and non-government stakeholders. As such it can be 
considered to be an important pre-requisitie for co-management, in the sense of a full 
partnership between government and non-governmental stakeholders. This is especially true 
given that co-management is usually introduced on a local level, which requires local 
communities to engage with local government, as well to receive national-level governmental 
support.  
Our case studies show that processes of decentralization are underway in all countries 
reviewed (except perhaps Viet Nam), and are especially developed in Philippines, Indonesia, 
Cook Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Japan. However, this has not led in all cases to 
successful co-management. Why might this be so? 
For some countries it may just be taking time for governments to adjust to the idea of really 
relinquishing power, with support for decentralization still being more rhetoric than reality, 
even if formally provided for in legislation. Certainly the process of decentralization is likely to 
proceed over time from “deconcentration” (of administration) to devolution, as more 
knowledge and experience is gained by both government and civil society. 
But perhaps more important is that in most countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Samoa, Vanuatu, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), decentralization processes have 
occurred as part of national non-sectoral policy on government administration, but not as part 
of fisheries policy/legislation. Only in India (through the federal system), Japan, Cook Islands, 
Vanuatu and Viet Nam is decentralization supported specifically within fisheries 
policy/legislation.6 In some cases (e.g. Thailand), this has raised questions about whether the 
local level government institutions that have been handed devolved power are in fact the 
right institutions to be engaged with fisheries co-management. In others, the motivation for 
decentralization has been political (Cambodia and Sri Lanka) rather than for more altruistic 
reasons of poverty reduction, good governance, or community participation. A number of 
case studies showed that, in support of the suggestion made by Bene and Nieland (2004), 
decentralization has enabled the strengthening of local elites, rather than the real 
empowerment of poor communities. 
                                                
6 Viet Nam  provides an anomolous case of a country which does not have a formal decentralization policy, but 
which has specific reference to decentralization within its fisheries legislation). 
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It would seem important therefore for decentralization to be included in fisheries policy and 
legislation, as is Japan, as well as in broader national level legislation. This would enable 
appropriate detail to be included on issues such as: the need for local level fisheries 
institutions (governmental and non-governmental) to generate and retain revenue to be 
subsequently used for co-management; instititional strengthening of fisheries institutions 
required at the local level; the distribution and limits to powers afforded to different groups; 
ensuring equitable involvement of all and fair distribution of benefits; deconcentration of 
fisheries budgets to the local level, etc. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 1:  Decentralization should be provided for in fisheries policy, not just 
in national non-sectoral policy/legislation, with references being specifically tied to a mention 
of its importance for co-management. 
 
Of our case studies, only in Japan and the Philippines, is co-management specifically dealt 
with in decentralization policy/legislation. Co-management and decentralization are vital to 
each other but initiatives for either one or the other are generally not undertaken conjointly or 
in a systematic way. It appears that within the fisheries context co-management is initiated 
first and decentralization of fisheries institutions is dealt with (if at all) as an after thought, 
with quick fix projects undertaken later to achieve some complementary effect between the 
two. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 2: It is better to undertake legal/policy reviews of decentralization of 
fisheries management/administration and co-management at the same time to ensure a 
cohesive and complementary effect. 
Fisheries policy and planning processes 
Fisheries policy serves as the overall framework for the broad development and 
management direction a country wishes to follow. It lays out the key goals for the sector, and 
while the level of detail varies from country to country, it may therefore be quite qualitative 
and broad in nature/scope. Fisheries policy documents differ hugely in shape and size 
between countries, but often contain a range of goals under sections in the document 
focusing on goals/ideals relating to, amongst other things: i) general principles; ii) fisheries 
management and enforcement; iii) post-harvest practices and trade; iv) technical and safety 
issues related to fishing operations; v) aquaculture development; vi) research; vii) human 
capacity development and institutional issues; viii) welfare and social issues; and ix) 
environmental issues. The policy framework is thus the first step in the planning process.  
The second step in the policy and planning process is to specify strategies in support of 
overall policy goals/targets in each of the sections of the policy. These strategies are those 
which, if put into practice, should bring about and realize the overall policy goals. Finally, a 
detailed time-bound action plan, specifying responsibilities, should lay out the activities to be 
undertaken under each strategy, to ensure that they are realised. These latter two steps are 
not strictly “policy” but are an integral part of the policy and planning process in a wider 
sense, and are also considered in this discussion. 
These three steps describe a “formal” policy and planning process and should form the basis 
for all subsequent implementation activities, subject of course to any unforeseen 
shocks/crisis to the sector or political necessities, which may also require a refocusing of 
activities. “Informal” policy is also therefore important; it is the evolving basis on which 
management and development actually takes place, and can differ substantially from formal 
policy. Informal policy can be reflected in written or spoken statements by policy actors, or 
may not be explicitly stated at all and only revealed through actions. 
The way that policy content is defined (i.e. the policy process) may itself be very important. 
Including a wide range of stakeholders in the policy process (whether formal or informal), 
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especially at the local level, is likely to improve the potential for policy content that is 
supportive of co-management. Indeed wide stakeholder involvement in policy development 
can itself be considered a form (and perhaps the first requirement) of co-management.  
Because stakeholders outside of government may have developed their own policies, and so 
engaging them in the policy process enhances the potential for the views of all to be aligned 
in some compatible form. Our case studies did not specifically examine the extent of 
participation in policy processes, but other work (Macfadyen, 2003) has shown that the 
extent/range of involvement by different groups in policy formation is very mixed in different 
countries.  
However, what the case studies did reveal was that in some countries, governments have 
not been quick to recognize and support the role of traditional management groups and local 
institutions in co-management processes. This is true of India (in the case of the sanghams), 
Thailand (where government decentralization focuses on the role of the TAOs rather than 
local fisher groups), and Indonesia (where the kewang have been marginalized). In contrast, 
in Japan government policy and legislation recognizes the FCAs, in Samoa village Fonos are 
incorporated into the policy process through legislation, and in the Philippines and the Cook 
Islands, governments have also been working well with established local groups. 
Policy processes, and a resulting policy environment supportive of co-management, can be 
improved through the following steps: 
• more emphasis on analysis of policy stakeholders, i.e. who should be involved; 
• legislation and/or formalization of policy processes to ensure appropriate 
involvement by all interests, and eventually, the protection of these interests; 
• careful planning to allow sufficient time and budgets for wide stakeholder 
involvement to become a reality; 
• working with fisher organizations to strengthen the ability of their representatives 
to participate meaningfully; 
• adaptation of workshop tools to cater for different educational levels and 
experience of technical issues, and to encourage contributions to be made by all 
at policy meetings; 
• making specific use of the different knowledge and experiences of different 
stakeholders; 
• formalization of methods to ensure transparency – i.e. full disclosure of 
information on the extent of the involvement by different parties, and reasons for 
inclusion and exclusion of particular issues in policy documents, the selection of 
key priorities, and the processes used; and 
• decentralization of policy development processes, which may increase both the 
potential for stakeholder involvement, but also accountability by bringing 
decision-making closer to the people. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 3: An enabling policy environment supportive of co-management is 
more likely when a wide range of stakeholders are involved in the process to develop policy 
itself. Indeed this could be considered the first step in co-management. 
Fisheries policy content 
Fisheries policy content can be supportive of co-management in a number of ways. In any 
general statements of principle, it can be supportive of participatory, consultative and 
transparent processes within the fisheries sector as discussed above (and as demonstrated 
by the Sri Lanka case study). General principles can also stress the need for cross-sectoral 
integration of policy, thereby bringing in other stakeholders to the process and even requiring 
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that management, for example of inland waters, be conducted in cooperation with other 
relevant line Ministries such as Water/Irrigation and Agriculture. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 4: Fisheries policy content can be supportive of co-management 
through the inclusion of general statements of principle about the need for i) participatory, 
consultative and transparent management of the fisheries sector, and ii) cross-sectoral 
integration. 
 
In direct references to fisheries management, policy can highlight co-management as a 
strategy to be used to achieve goals of, for example, sustainable resource use. From our 
case studies it is evident that some countries in Asia and the Pacific (e.g., Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia) do not yet have such references in their formal fisheries policy 
documents. Once such references are included, specific actions can then be declared as to 
how, and in what form, co-management should take place. Certainly it is true that in Asia and 
the Pacific as a whole, as policy is continually revised, issues relating to co-management are 
increasingly being incorporated into policy documents. In Pakistan (not covered as a case 
study in this report), for example, until the present time no formal national fisheries sector 
policy has been specified. However, a process7 is now underway to agree a national policy. 
Draft text of the policy suggests that community-based fisheries management will be 
promoted in coastal and inland water bodies as a means of adopting better management 
practices. Likewise, in the new Vietnamese fisheries policy expected to be approved in early 
2006, co-management is specifically mentioned. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 5: Fisheries policy documents can highlight co-management as a 
strategy to be used to bring about fisheries management goals, or as an integral part of those 
goals – e.g., “fisheries will be managed to ensure the long-term sustainability of resources, 
using a co-management approach”. 
 
Even with a favourable policy and legislative framework, the success of co-management, in 
whichever one of its many forms, can be significantly affected by each particular social and 
cultural context. Nevertheless, given the work that has been conducted over the past couple 
of decades, some of the key determinants of success for co-/community-management 
arrangements are now becoming clearer. These have been nicely summarized by both 
Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Pomeroy et al. (2001). 
Ostrom suggests that key factors in success are: clearly defined boundaries; membership 
that is clearly defined; benefits that exceed costs; inclusion of most individuals affected by 
the management arrangements in the group that makes and can change the arrangements; 
sharing of the responsibility for enforcement; and cooperation and good leadership at the 
community level. 
Pomeroy et al. review and expand on these criteria of success, and propose 28 of their own. 
These are listed in Box 2. 
                                                
7 This is being supported by an FAO Technical Cooperation Project, “Support to Fisheries Sector Policy and 
Strategy Formulation” (TCP/PAK/3005 (A)). 
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As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the intention of the case studies and this 
concluding section is not to explore wider issues about implementation and requirements for 
successful co-management, except where they relate specifically to policy and legislation. 
However, our case studies support these general conclusions about success factors, and 
policy content can be supportive of the successful implementation of co-management either 
directly or indirectly, by including some mention of them.  
In particular, the case studies in Section 2 re-affirm the importance of a number of issues 
which should be included in fisheries policy if it is to be supportive of co-management. Policy 
should provide support for and recognize the importance of the following. 
• User rights (as is possible for communities in Cambodia, Japan, Fiji, Vanuatu, 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka, but not in Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Viet Nam and 
Thailand (except in the form of individual licences or leasing systems to 
individuals)). 
• Leadership and strengthening the ability of community-based institutions to 
engage in co-management through capacity development. 
• Recognition of local groups and their importance in co-management. (As noted 
above, this has not always been the case in India, Thailand, and Indonesia, but 
has been successfully achieved in Japan, Philippines, Samoa and the Cook 
Islands). 
• Local political support. (In both the Philippines and Cambodia the case studies 
showed how local political leaders can have a huge impact on co-management 
success, with interference or a lack of support by such leaders greatly hindering 
co-management). 
• The need for strong incentives for stakeholders to participate based on the costs 
and benefits of doing so. (In Viet Nam for example, the case study raised 
questions about the costs of engaging in co-management actions in terms of time 
and money. Local groups found that incentives for group cohesion (important for 
Box 2.  Criteria for successful co-/community management of fisheries               
(Pomeroy et al. 2001) 
 
1) Individual incentive structure  15) Political and social stability  
2) Recognition of resource 
management problems 
 16) Networking and advocacy 
3) Leadership  17) Enabling policies and legislation 
4) Stakeholder involvement  18) Provision of financial resources/budget 
5) Empowerment  19) Government agency support 
6) Trust between partners  20) Fit with existing and traditional social and 
cultural institutions and structures of the 
community 
7) Property rights over the resource  21) Partner sense of ownership of the co-
management process 
8) Local political support  22) Effective enforcement 
9) Capability building  23) Partnerships and contractual agreements 
10) Legitimate organizations that 
have a clearly defined 
membership 
 24) Overlap of interests 
11) Conflict management  25) Flexibility 
12) External agents (co-management 
often needs change agents from 
the outside to expedite the 
process) 
 26) Appropriate scale of area under management 
13) Clear objectives from a well-
defined set of issues 
 27) Coordinating body 
14) Effective communication  28) Social preparation and value formation 
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co-management) were provided by including additional welfare and social 
functions in addition to the co-management functions of the groups.) 
• The need for formal legislation to back up/codify community rules and resolve 
disputes. (This has been successfully achieved in Japan, Fiji, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Sri Lanka.) 
 
Directly, policy documents can therefore include statements to the effect that co-
management will be supported through support for such success factors. For example, a 
statement might be included to the effect that: “Co-management processes will be supported 
through an appropriate legislative environment providing for community use rights, through 
institutional strengthening of community-level organizations, through clear definition of 
management boundaries and responsibilities, etc”. 
Indirectly, policy content can also include support for co-management success factors, but in 
statements not directly related to co-management. For example, policy might provide for 
empowerment of local communities and institutions through the provision of support 
(financial and legislative) and capacity building. Such support, which may not be driven 
primarily with co-management in mind, would likely increase the chances that co-
management initiatives would themselves be successful. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 6: Policy content should either make specific reference to known 
success factors in connection with statements on co-management, or should indirectly be 
supportive of such success factors. Such factors include, but are not limited to: 
• User rights. 
• Institutional strength of local organizations and their leadership. 
• Recognition of existing local fisher community organizations as fundamental to the co-
management process. 
• Local political support. 
• Appropriate incentives for local users to engage with co-management. 
• The need for formal legislation to back up/codify community rules and resolve disputes. 
 
 
Given the potential that co-management may provide for improved resource management, 
and the strong role of donors in supporting what have so far largely been pilot initiatives (e.g. 
in Thailand, Philippines, Viet Nam  and Bangladesh), continued efforts need to be made to 
understand and research co-management. Recognising the need to move beyond just pilot 
approaches, sections of fisheries policy relating to research requirements could specifically 
mention the need to research co-management and mechanisms for its mainstreaming and 
sustainability. In addition, the literature is still rather short on empirical examples of the 
positive impacts of co-management, although in our case studies Japan, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Thailand demonstrated successes. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 7: Policy should contain support for research on how to move beyond 
pilot approaches to mainstreaming co-management, and on assessing the positive impacts of 
co-management. 
Consistent policy and the need to remain committed 
Our case studies (Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, amongst others) have shown that 
developing effective co-management takes time, resources and commitment. In many 
countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia (after an initial push from political unrest), Fiji, Philippines, 
and Viet Nam ), co-management has been supported strongly by donor initiatives, and there 
remain questions about capacity for sustainability (particularly in terms of the institutional 
strength of the different institutions involved). It is therefore crucial that both policy content 
and policy processes that are supportive of co-management remain in place, and that 
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practitioners realize that achieving meaningful results is a long-term process that requires 
institutional strengthening and building of trust between all relevant parties. This applies not 
just at the national level, but as noted above is also very important at the local level where 
the support of local political figures is extremely important. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 8: A policy framework supportive of co-management must be kept in 
place for the long term so as to ensure gradual improvements and institutionalization of 
partnership arrangements, based on appropriate provision of financial resources and 
commitments to institutional strengthening. 
Co-management partners 
The case studies have revealed that almost all co-management initiatives have focussed on 
small-scale fishers and local NGOs as the government’s main partners, often because of the 
need to change established community management practices into more formal co-
management arrangements in the face of increasing competition for resources etc. In cases 
where the motivation for co-management has been conflict with industrial vessels (e.g. 
Thailand), it is not thought that these industrial vessels are generally included within the co-
management arrangements. In addition, there is often much discussion in fisheries policy 
circles about conflicts between industrial and small-scale interests, the negative impacts that 
industrial activities can have on small-scale fisheries, and therefore the need to control the 
activities of industrial vessels so as to benefit small-scale fisheries. Furthermore, when one 
considers the large number of industrial vessels in many countries in Asia and the Pacific, 
and the quantity of catches they make, this raises a question as to whether co-management 
initiatives should be trying to engage more fully with larger industrial/commercial interests. 
Support for such an approach is also provided by the often-evident difficulties of 
managing/controlling huge numbers of small-scale fishers. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 9. Co-management initiatives might do well to engage more fully with 
larger-scale commercial/industrial interests so as to co-opt them into co-management 
partnerships. 
 
On another level, in a number of countries, fisheries administrations do not conduct technical 
research on their own, but rely on specialized public research institutions. This allows for a 
clear distinction between enactment and enforcement of laws and regulations on the one 
hand, and technological developments on the other. The accumulation of such mandates at 
the national level, the failure of much research to respond to local level needs/requirements, 
and a breakdown in the research-policy linkage, all pose problems for decentralization, 
where requirements are very locally specific. 
 
Policy Conclusion No. 10. Co-management initiatives can be enhanced and supported through 
appropriate local level research and better linkages between researchers and policy markers 
at the local level. 
 
Finally in relation co-management partners, scale appears more and more to play a critical 
role in fishery co-management processes. “Community” itself can be defined at different 
scales based on kinship or religion in a village, business interests, housing locations, fishing 
areas, or geo-political boundaries. Fisheries managers and stock assessment scientists may 
have a totally different vision than both local political administrations and fishers/fishing 
communities regarding an appropriate area of co-management.  
A compromise has therefore to be found between a scale/unit that is large enough to relate 
to ecosystem functions and fits in some way with local political/administrative boundaries, but 
which is small enough to be effective in coordinating among participants. 
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Policy Conclusion No. 11. Great care must be taken to specify appropriate scales of co-
management. 
 
3.3 A legal framework supportive of fisheries co-management 
As Pomeroy (2001) notes, the legal basis for resource users’ participation in resource 
management is vital and must address fundamental concerns, which include: i) who has the 
right to use the resource? ii) who owns the resource? and iii) as arrangements may be 
undermined in the absence of a legal basis, what is the legal framework for implementing co-
management? The role of the government in establishing conditions for co-management is 
therefore crucial. Having considered policy issues in the section above, we now turn to key 
legislative conclusions and lessons learned, as identified from the case studies.  
Non-fisheries specific legislation (constitutions, decentralization and others) 
It is important to note that the legal framework in which fisheries operate, including legislation 
that facilitates co-management, is not restricted to fisheries-specific legislation.  
While no fundamental laws (constitutions) deal with co-management per se, a principal 
consideration is to determine whether the fundamental law permits the establishment of 
participatory management.  If the fundamental law stipulates that certain components of co-
management are not possible, then co-management in its fullest sense may be hindered.  
Provisions dealing with decentralization through, for instance the establishment of 
decentralized institutions, are often found either in the fundamental law, or in national 
legislation on decentralization, as shown by the case studies. It is on the basis of such 
provisions that the decentralization process is undertaken. Where decentralization laws exist, 
it should be ascertained by fisheries practitioners as to how co-management is facilitated 
through decentralization institutions such as regional, provincial or local 
governments/councils, and how such institutions fit with, and relate to, decentralized fisheries 
management structures. 
Just as for the specific case of co-management and decentralization, other legislation 
relating to local government and other natural resources management e.g. land, water, 
environment etc. needs to be considered for its impact on, and support for, co-management 
in fisheries. In Sri Lanka for example, the case study noted how the Special Area 
Management process is primarily driven not by fisheries legislation, but through coastal 
conservation legislation.  
The fact that fisheries are affected by legislation non-specific to the sector must be 
recognized when developing fisheries legislation to be supportive of co-management. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 1: Non-fisheries specific legislation should be considered for its 
support or hindrance to fisheries co-management, as well as for its relationship to specific 
fisheries legislation (either in place or being developed) that is supportive of co-management. 
Issues of process 
The statements made in Section 3.2 on the need for participatory policy processes also apply 
to the development of fisheries legislation. As with policy, it is important that a wide range of 
stakeholders are incorporated into the process of developing legislation. By doing so, 
legislation is more likely to supportive of co-management, and where it impacts on co-
management is then more likely to meet the needs and desires of different co-management 
partners, and to have a measure of legitimacy. Better compliance can be fostered by 
legislation that involves all stakeholders in its development as stakeholders can claim 
“ownership” over such laws. 
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Legislation Conclusion No. 2: A legal framework supportive of co-management, and supported 
by stakeholders, is more likely when a wide range of stakeholders are involved in the process 
to develop legislation itself. 
 
In the policy section above, we suggested that it is important for co-management and 
decentralization to be dealt with at the same time when developing fisheries law. Case 
studies show that they are generally undertaken separately. In some instances, co-
management experiences have been started locally, through a project, with an insufficient 
legal framework supporting such initiatives.  
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 3: Co-management initiatives should ideally ensure that fisheries 
legislation is supportive of them and of decentralization of fisheries management before 
commencing. 
 
In all our cases, local by-laws or regulations have been put in place to support co-
management initiatives. But the studies (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand) also showed that local 
rules/legislation have not always agreed with national policy and legislation. In addition, it is 
noted how conflict resolution is a key driving factor of many co-management initiatives. Both 
factors point to the need for dispute resolution mechanisms. The Sri Lanka case study 
showed how such mechanisms have been successfully used to resolve conflicts and codify 
community management arrangements. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 4: Fisheries legislation should contain dispute resolution 
mechanisms to deal with user conflicts, and to ensure that local rules/regulations do not 
conflict with national-level legislation and policy. 
 
In relation to the point made above about conflicts between co-management rules and 
national legislation, it should be noted that the rules of a designated local management unit 
or community cannot define the limits of state power. Such a role is played by national 
legislation. Thus the extent to which the state will respect local autonomy and where and 
under what conditions it will retain the power to intervene should be spelled out in 
legislation.8 For example, in Indonesia, The 1999 Autonomy Act establishes a control 
mechanism designed to ensure the conformity of regional regulations with higher-ranking 
legal norms whereby the central government is empowered to revoke regional regulations 
that are found to be conflicting with government regulations or laws. In the case of Bang 
Saphan Bay in Thailand, on the other hand, national legislation on activities within the 3km 
zone has not always reflected local views about appropriate management decisions on how 
manage the area under community/co-management. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 5: Fisheries legislation should specify the extent to which local 
autonomy in developing management rules/legislation will be accepted. 
 
                                                
8 From a property rights regime perspective, this touches upon the fundamental question of who owns the natural 
resources. Most fishing nations that implement a rights-based regime retain the power to allocate, and withdraw 
rights and change the regulations governing their administration.  If the rules governing a rights-based regime are 
explicit in the form of legislation, it is less problematic in administering them and deflecting legal challenges. 
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Content of fisheries legislation 
National fisheries legislation should provide for a broad legislative framework that enables a 
choice over co-management arrangements and rules to suit local circumstances and to 
promote what works. An optimal legislative framework for co-management should also be 
flexible i.e. the legislation must enable the designated local group or community managers to 
exercise choices that reflect their unique needs, conditions and aspirations. Ultimately, a 
flexible co-management legislative framework must allow for changes in policy, and should 
preferably provide a framework law, which allows detailed mechanisms to be set out in 
regulations that can be easily amended. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 6: National fisheries legislation should provide for a broad and 
flexible legislative framework that enables a choice over co-management arrangements and 
rules, with detailed mechanisms set out in regulations that can be changed if necessary. 
 
As with the policy framework, to be supportive of co-management the legislative framework 
should either make specific recognition of co-management, or cover those success factors of 
co-management (as discussed in Section3.2) that may need to be backed-up through their 
inclusion in fisheries legislation. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 7: National fisheries legislation should contain specific reference 
to co-management, or provide indirect support to key success factors that need legislative 
support. 
 
Decentralization 
As noted above, non-fisheries-specific decentralization legislation often determines the 
nature of the powers to be transferred to designated authorities (e.g. provinces, districts, 
communes), but only in general terms. Seldom, if at all, does such legislation make reference 
to co-management or to fisheries. Because decentralized institutions (fisheries-specific and 
non-fisheries) play a key role in facilitating (or interfering with) co-management, their role 
may need to be defined in specialized legislation (i.e. fisheries and other legislation e.g. 
natural resources) rather than in the decentralization law. 
Definition of boundaries 
Deciding on and legislating for the boundaries of an area under co-management can be 
difficult (see Section 3.2). Nevertheless, the definition of the geographical boundaries of 
community/local government organizations and the process used to define them, seem from 
the case studies to be especially important. 
Recognition of use rights and community-based rules  
The allocation of user rights to groups engaged in co-management initiatives is likely to 
increase the chance of co-management success. The Thai case study showed clearly how 
the failure to allocate use rights over the community management area prevented those 
engaged in the management exercise from stopping outsiders from entering the fishery, 
which in turn has led them to question to benefits of co-management. Situations such as 
these are likely to minimize the benefits of co-management for local stakeholders, and 
therefore to raise questions about sustainability in the long-term. While the recognition of 
such rights in formal law may on its own fail to achieve effective fisheries management, 
because of weak internal governance to provide a supportive framework, fisheries legislation 
should nevertheless contain provision for such use rights to be allocated in co-management 
areas. 
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Co-management legislation should also provide protection for local institutions from trespass 
and the criminal behaviour of outsiders. It should give legal recognition to community-based 
rules and command conformity by the public to those rules. 
The case studies suggest that while community-based fisheries management is at one end 
of the spectrum of co-management, such community arrangements are coming increasingly 
under threat in the face of increasing competition of resources. A number of the studies (e.g. 
Sri Lanka, Samoa, Philippines, Japan, Fiji and the Cook Islands) have shown how 
government can – and indeed may need to – provide legitimacy and accountability to 
community arrangements through supportive legislation, thereby evolving the community 
arrangements into a more co-management approach involving government. Only 
government can legally establish and defend user rights and security of tenure. 
Specification of powers to co-management partners 
Co-management law must also provide protection for individuals against the abuse of local 
power. For example, in the Cambodia case study we saw how the legislative framework does 
not address the issue of equitable representation of the local community’s interests in the 
community fisheries, and how this has the potential to lead to the “highjacking” of the 
community fisheries by a small group of well-organized individuals. 
 
Legislation Conclusion No. 8: In sum, fisheries legislation needs to ensure that the legal 
framework clearly states 
• roles and responsibilities under decentralization policy/legislation; 
• how co-management areas and co-management partners are to be defined; 
• security and enforceability of a right; 
• the ability and opportunity for rights holders to seek redress for violation of security and 
interests in the rights allocated; 
• the nature and extent of recognition of locally promulgated rules; 
• rules for interaction between stakeholders; and 
• rules for interaction with the state, including the limits and conditions for state 
intervention and protection of individuals against abuse of “local” power. 
 
Legal conclusions 
The application of co-management is site-specific. Given this, any law that is enacted for 
establishing co-management should preferably be a “framework” law. The framework law 
must primarily enable the use of co-management through provisions that ensure security, 
exclusivity and permanence for any rights that may be allocated. However, the legal 
framework should also, as a minimum, ensure that powers are vested or entities are 
designated to invoke co-management when the need arises. The provisions of the 
framework law that provide for these must allow: 
• the designation of groups or community unit that will be involved in co-
management and that such groups may be allocated rights and responsibilities in 
fishing and fisheries management; 
• choices in the manner in which designation of groups or community units will be 
effected; 
• choice in demarcation of areas for co-management; and, 
• choices in the institutional or organizational framework for co-management. 
 
Above all, the legal framework for co-management must be practical and flexible to respond 
to changing needs and priorities. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This paper has focussed on identifying the policy and legislative environment that is 
supportive of co-management, through a review of the status of the policy and legislative 
framework in 13 case study countries. It does not attempt to deal in any great detail with 
other success factors of co-management or with the implementation of policy and legislation, 
although the case studies do reveal a range of implementation problems, and highlight the 
fact that illegal fishing activity continues in many cases. 
What is clear is that co-management is an emerging trend within the countries examined, 
although many forms of it may have been in existence for some time. This trend is driven by 
an awareness of resource depletion, conflicts both within the sector and between fisheries 
and other sectors, and the perceived benefits of co-management as an approach. In the face 
of increasing pressure on resources, the need to formally codify existing community 
management practices through greater government involvement and legislative support, has 
also been important. Furthermore, implementation of co-management is now being 
encouraged, or at least enabled, by decentralization policies in almost all of the case study 
countries.  
The extent to which the policy and legislative frameworks of the case study countries are 
supportive of co-management varies greatly. All countries, with the possible exception of 
Japan, need to do more work particularly in the area of ensuring cohesion and 
compatibility between policy and legislation on the one hand, and between decentralization 
and fisheries management (co-management) on the other. 
Many of the co-management practices currently being tried remain pilot studies only, and are 
strongly driven and supported by donor projects, and community management remains more 
common than full co-management. In addition, commitment by governments to co-
management is varied, and in some cases based more in rhetoric than reality, with 
insufficient real transfer of powers and financial resources to local levels. This partly explains 
why policy, legislation and associated action, have not always been as supportive of co-
management as they might be, despite on-going co-management initiatives. This study has 
suggested a number of policy and legislative conclusions and ideas about best practice, 
which could be adopted by governments to demonstrate their commitment for co-
management. 
The principal policy and legal implication for fisheries co-management is to determine 
whether national policy and legal environments provide a supportive framework for co-
management or not, and if not, then to make necessary changes. 
Political will is the key to the establishment of co-management mechanisms. It is a necessary 
pre-requisite without which co-management initiatives are unlikely to succeed. It must be 
reflected in policy, legislation and action specific to the fisheries sector, as well as more 
generally in government policy and legislative support. 
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http://www.mekonginfo.org 
http://www.worldfishcenter.org/basicsearch.asp 
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APPENDIX 2 
STATUS OF ENABLING POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT IN APFIC COUNTRIES 
The table on the following page attempts to highlight some of the key aspects of a policy and 
legislative framework that are considered to be supportive of co-management. The table could be 
completed for all APFIC countries. The table is divided into two sections, the first factual, and the 
second more subjective. For the more subjective questions, it is suggested that a coding system 
should be used with V (very), Q (quite) and N (not or little) used to determine the extent to which 
the supportive attribute is felt to be in place, or the extent to which the statement is true. 
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Factual information 
 
Response/example 
 
• What are the current fisheries policy (and planning) document(s) National Fisheries Policy, 2002 
Fisheries Strategy 2005-2010 
• Do fisheries policy documents specifically refer to co-management, and if so in what 
capacity 
Yes, in the context of being a method to be 
used for sustainable resource management 
• If fisheries policy documents specifically refer to co-management, are such 
references focused on community management, or on wider co-management 
practices 
Strong emphasis on community 
management 
• If fisheries policy documents specifically refer to co-management, how long has this 
been the case 
3 years 
• If fisheries policy documents specifically refer to co-management, do such 
references apply to large/commercial fisheries as well as small-scale fisheries 
No. Emphasis is on community 
management of small-scale fisheries 
• If fisheries policy documents specifically refer to co-management, do such 
references make any reference to the scale of co-management 
areas/arrangements. 
Yes in the form of local beach management 
units based on village location 
• Do fisheries policy documents contain any general principles/requirements about 
participation, consultation and transparency 
No 
• Do fisheries policy documents provide for the provision of community/group use 
rights 
Yes 
• Do fisheries policy documents state that legislation should provide support for co-
management 
Yes 
• Do fisheries policy documents provide for institutional strengthening of local 
government and/or non-government organizations 
Yes 
• Do fisheries policy documents contain reference to, or provision for decentralization 
of fisheries management activities 
No 
• Is decentralization provided for in the country’s constitution or in specific national 
legislation on decentralization 
Yes. Government Decentralization Act of 
2000 
• What is the current national fisheries legislation Fishery Law of 2000 
• Is there non-fisheries legislation which supports co-management, and if so what Yes. Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
Act, 2000  
• Does national fisheries legislation make special provisions for co-management. If 
yes, what are they 
Yes. Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries 
Management; provides for establishment of 
co-management committees 
• Are there any specific regulations or by-laws at the local level which help to codify 
and support community management rules 
Yes many. E.g. X Bay fishing regulations, 
1999 
• Does fisheries legislation contain dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with user 
conflicts 
Yes 
• Does fisheries legislation specify the extent to which local areas can impose 
regulations, so as to ensure that local rules/regulations do not conflict with national-
level legislation and policy 
No 
• Which of the following items are included in fisheries legislation: 
¾ roles and responsibilities under decentralization policy/legislation 
¾ how co-management areas and co-management partners are to be defined  
¾ security and enforceability of a right; 
¾ the creation of ability and opportunity for rights holders to seek redress for 
violation of security and interests in the rights allocated; 
¾ the nature and extent of recognition of locally promulgated rules; 
¾ rules for interaction between stakeholders; 
¾ rules for interaction with the state, including the limits and conditions for state 
intervention and protection of individuals against abuse of “local” power 
 
 
How to define co-management areas. 
Group user rights. 
Processes of redress 
 
Subjective opinion 
 
 
Response/example 
• To what extent are processes used to develop fisheries policy participatory Q. Large numbers of small-scale fishermen 
and poor representation makes full 
participation difficult, and Government not 
always keen to listen 
• To what extent are processes used to develop fisheries legislation participatory N. No legislative participatory road show as 
is the case for policy development 
• To what extent does national fisheries legislation provide a broad and flexible 
framework for co-management 
Q. Flexible and broad, but could have more 
mention of … 
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pristine outer atoll lagoons are considered suitable for targeted 
commercial mariculture development. The Marshall Islands 
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